According to Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa at The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, a correct analysis of knowledge would do more than pick out the actual extension of knowledge; even if, in actual fact, all cases of S knowing that p are cases of j, and all cases of the latter are cases of the former, j might fail as an analysis of knowledge. For example, it might be that there are possible cases of knowledge without j, or vice versa. A proper analysis of knowledge should at least be a necessary truth. Consequently, hypothetical thought experiments provide appropriate test cases for various analyses, but even a necessary biconditional linking knowledge to some state j would probably not be sufficient for an analysis of knowledge, although just what more is required is a matter of some controversy. Ref

Knowledge without Belief?

Justified beliefs or disbeliefs worthy of Knowledge?

I wrote this and a challenger responded, ” Atheism and the traditional laws of logic?

Three traditional laws of logic: Law of Identity, Law of non-contradiction, Law of excluded middle.

Law of Identity: ‘Whatever is, is.’

Thus, Atheism is Atheism, it is not theism nor agnosticism.

Law of non-contradiction: ‘Nothing can both be and not be.’

Thus, Atheism is either only Atheism and cannot be also theism nor agnosticism.

Law of excluded middle: ‘Everything must either be or not be.”

Thus, Atheism must either be or not Atheism and only then can there be theism or agnosticism.

And, thus because of the three traditional laws of logic the term agnostic atheism can be logically rejected for just Atheism by itself. Ref

*Challenger, “Except theism and atheism are the subject of belief, and gnosticism is the subject of knowledge. Both are two entirely separate topics, and thus your post is nonsense.”

Damien Marie AtHope, What is a god?

*Challenger, “A supernatural being of great power”

Damien Marie AtHope, How do you know that?

*Challenger, “It’s a definition for the word god. You might as well ask me how I know what the definition for angry is. When you debate the existence of a god or gods, you use a commonly agreed definition of said thing and go from there.”

Damien Marie AtHope, So you believe the definition or you know that is the definition so I can understand your confusion?

*Challenger, “I know that is one of a number of definitions that can be used when describing the term ‘god’.”

Damien Marie AtHope, So you have nothing to believe because you don’t know you only have claims?

*Challenger, “Erm, I’m not claiming anything if that’s what you’re asking. I don’t know that a “god”, as per my description, doesn’t exist, but I have no belief in one either. I do not claim that one does not exist.”

Damien Marie AtHope, You don’t know the term god as anything of substance, outside a unfounded claims right? Do you believe them or know them?

*Challenger, “No. Don’t focus on a universal definition of god. You’re trying too hard to make God mean the same thing to all people. God means different things to different people. I said my description was “a” description of a god. For that particular description of the word “god”, I am an atheist and agnostic. You describe something to me and I’ll tell you whether I’m a(that thing) or not, and whether I’m agnostic towards that thing or not.”

Damien Marie AtHope, So you don’t believe in the definition of unfounded claims about the term god then you know that much about your nonbelief right?

Why do you believe you know that beliefs are not coming from/connected to knowledge? As it is a standard in philosophy that both knowledge and certainly are epistemic properties of belief. Here is an article on that: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/certainty/

*Challenger, “Damien Marie AtHope I don’t believe the unfounded claims that a god exists, as per the typically used definitions of the word god. Einstein had knowledge of black holes. His theory predicted them in all their glory, and yet he didn’t believe they were real. Creationists are presented with evidence that the earth is older than 10,000 years old. They have knowledge of the evidence that contradict their religious beliefs, and yet they don’t change their mind. They don’t believe the earth is 4.56 billion years old, even though they have been given knowledge that proves otherwise. Having knowledge of something does not equal belief.”

Damien Marie AtHope, So, you do or don’t believe the unsupported agnostic claim that knowledge and certainty are not connected to beliefs?

*Challenger, “They CAN be, but they don’t have to be. Knowledge of something is required if you are to believe in it, but not the other way round. Someone who has never heard of the god concept for example is both an atheist and an agnostic. S/he does not express belief in a god, and s/he does not claim knowledge of ones existence either.”

Damien Marie AtHope, Can you please provide a valid philosophy article, that backs up your claim, “They CAN be, but they don’t have to be. Knowledge of something is required if you are to believe in it, but not the other way round.”

*Challenger, “The Analysis of Knowledge https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/

Damien Marie AtHope, Ok Challenger, what in that article are you trying to support, “The attempt to analyze knowledge has received a considerable amount of attention from epistemologists, particularly in the late 20th Century, but no analysis has been widely accepted.” I don’t see it proving you claim, “Knowledge of something is required if you are to believe in it, but not the other way round.”

Damien Marie AtHope, Do you support your article saying,

“The Belief Condition:

The belief condition is slightly more controversial than the truth condition, although it is certainly accepted by orthodoxy. Although initially it might seem obvious that knowing that p requires believing that p, some philosophers have argued that knowledge without belief is indeed possible. Suppose Walter comes home after work to find out that his house has burned down. He says: “I don’t believe it.” Critics of the belief condition might argue that Walter knows that his house has burned down (he sees that it has), but, as his words indicate, he does not believe that his house has burned down. Therefore, there is knowledge without belief. The dominant view, however, is that Walter’s avowal of disbelief is not, strictly speaking, literally true; what Walter wishes to convey by saying “I don’t believe it” is not that he really does not believe that his house has burned down, but rather that he finds it hard to come to terms with what he sees. If he didn’t genuinely believe it, some of his subsequent actions, such as phoning his insurance company, would be rather mysterious. A more serious counterexample has been suggested by Colin Radford (1966). Suppose Albert is quizzed on English history. One of the questions is: “When did Queen Elizabeth die?” Albert doesn’t think he knows, but answers the question correctly. Moreover, he gives correct answers to many other questions to which he didn’t think he knew the answer. Let us focus on Albert’s answer to the question about Elizabeth:

(E) Elizabeth died in 1603.

Radford makes the following two claims about this example:

Albert does not believe (E).

Albert knows (E).

Radford’s intuitions about cases like these do not seem to be idiosyncratic; Myers-Schutz & Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) find evidence suggesting that many ordinary speakers tend to react in the way Radford suggests.[3]

In support of (a), Radford emphasizes that Albert thinks he doesn’t know the answer to the question. He doesn’t trust his answer because he takes it to be a mere guess. In support of (b), Radford argues that Albert’s answer is not at all just a lucky guess. The fact that he answers most of the questions correctly indicates that he has actually learned, and never forgotten, the basic facts of English history.

Since he takes (a) and (b) to be true, Radford would argue that knowledge without belief is indeed possible. But either of (a) and (b) might be resisted. Those who think that belief is necessary for knowledge could deny (a), arguing that Albert does have a tacit belief that (E), even though it’s not one that he thinks amounts to knowledge. Alternatively, one might deny (b), arguing that Albert’s correct answer is not an expression of knowledge, perhaps because, given his subjective position, he does not have justification for believing (E). This reply anticipates the next section, involving the necessity of the justification condition.”

Damien Marie AtHope:

“some philosophers have argued that knowledge without belief is indeed possible.” – your article

“Knowledge of something is required if you are to believe in it, but not the other way round.” – you