Atheophobia is a term used to describe the fear, distrust, or hatred of atheists or atheism. But most often it is exhibited in the belief that one being an atheist should be consider as them being morally inferior or incapable of being or having morality (ie. belief an atheist can’t be a good person). This and other atheophobic bigotry or discrimination can lead to a kind invisibility for many atheists, who find it is best to keep their nonbelief hidden or say any other label but atheist to not be treated differently, most especially with religious family but to a larger extent with society at large. Many holy books take a strong and negative atheophobic stance, some even talking of death. Ref

 Challenger. “Don’t dignify religious bigotry by giving it a name that does not explicitly refer to religious bigotry. I think is better defined as “Fear that there might not be a god” This better explains the reaction of the religion to those who do not agree with them. It is founded upon fear that they are wrong.”

Damien Marie AtHope, “So, you think that is a logical line of reasoning that we should not give bigotry a name as you hold (it would seem) that to do so dignifies the bigotry to you? Is so, how is that different from any form of bigotry? So, should we as you claim, state that we don’t wish to dignify bigotry, thus, to you we should not give them a name? Like you don’t think we should have a word like racism? Sexism? Homophobia? Xenophobia? Etc.?”

Challenger. “Bigotry already has a name – BIGOTRY. To give it another term to hide behind risks just that – being hidden behind.”

Damien Marie AtHope, “and the different terms for types of bigotry you are also against and can you will explain how this s a rational belief? so, you are avoiding your dislike or your support for the terms like racism? Sexism? Homophobia? Xenophobia? Etc.?”

Challenger. “If you need to ask, you have not read anything I have written, anywhere. Both are forms of bigotry, and I think I have made my position of bigotry very clear. Why are you raising this straw man when we are discussing the pros and cons of -phobias, not -isms? Are you against arachnophobia? That makes as much sense as your question. No, Damien, it is ot illogical. That you reject it is no more logical and is an error in reasoning. Why? Because your claim to be it being logical is unsupported as it is, like mine, mere;y an opinion. Disagreeing with you is not a logical error, though you seem. Unusually for you, to think that in this instance it is. Of course, had you supported your original claim about the etymology and meaning of atheophobia AND produced evidence to demonstrate that my suggestions were without foundation rather than merely repeat your opinion, then you would not, in this instance, be hoist with your own petard – unsupported assertion – and have no need to fall back on an error of logic which you are projecting upon me when it is you who is guilty of it. You are normally better than that.”

Damien Marie AtHope, here are some facts on STUDIES OF BIGOTRY:

“Importantly, some of the earliest social science research addressing the problem of bigotry focused on patterns of interaction and violence perpetrated by whites against African Americans in the United States. Until the late 1950s, blatant racism and physical violence directed at African Americans was normative and well entrenched within the social fabric of American society. Whereas some blamed white fears about miscegenation (i.e., interracial sexual relations) for the collective violence directed at the newly freed class of citizens, others generally attributed the problem to the expanding rights of African Americans. Contemporary research and theory on bigotry can be conceptualized along a continuum. At one end are those theories that locate the causes of bigotry outside of the individual at the societal level (i.e., the macro level of analysis). These types of theories are largely context dependent. At the other end of this conceptual continuum are explanations for bigotry that attribute causality to internal factors such as deficiencies in the individual’s personality, limitations in information-processing capacities, or physiological and biological mechanisms. Many of the efforts toward understanding the problem of bigotry have involved individualistic accounts of prejudice focusing on such cognitive processes as stereotyping, categorization, and learning. In the U.S. tradition of social psychology, researchers have tended to focus on the individual’s thought processes and experiences while overlooking or minimizing ways that the wider social context can instigate bigotry (Bar-Tal and Teichman 2005). In contrast, researchers outside of the United States, as well as many of those within the discipline of sociology (e.g., Feagin and Feagin 1986), have focused upon the institutional and structural factors that can be both causes and effects of bigotry. According to this approach, current institutional policies and organizational structures continue to discriminate because they were established in the past by those most privileged by discriminatory policies. Because of these policies, people who were targets of prejudice in the past continue to experience discrimination long after explicit expressions of bigotry and acknowledgement of prejudice have ceased to occur. Although interest in studying bigotry has varied over the years, a renewed interest in the topic is evident among researchers addressing issues related to cyberhate, terrorism, and religious and nationalistic fanaticism. In the case of cyberhate, the speed of the Internet and its widespread accessibility make the spread of bigotry almost instantaneous and increasingly available to vulnerable populations (Craig-Henderson 2006). As for the relationship between bigotry and nationalism, there are a host of researchers studying the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East (e.g., Bar-Tal and Teichman 2005). That particular conflict has roots in the Zionist occupation of the country of Israel, formerly known as Palestine. Because of the historical realities that have created the state of Israel, today’s Arabs and Jews in that region have very distinct group identities that have given rise to their intergroup conflict. Social science researchers who study this kind of group conflict have demonstrated that the strength of identification with one’s in-group is associated with one’s expressed bigotry toward the out-group. In many situations, the more strongly one identifies with an in-group, the more bigoted one is against members of the out-group. Bigotry can be minimal and manifested in avoidance or social exclusion of the out-group, or it can be severe and deadly. In 1998 James Byrd Jr., an African American man in Jasper, Texas, was murdered by white supremacists who dragged him to death behind their pickup truck after offering him a ride home. As members of a white supremacist group, Byrd’s murderers were extreme in their bigotry. As a black man, Byrd was perceived by his murderers to be a member of a despised out-group. Similarly, brutal attacks have targeted sexual minorities. In 1998 the murder of the college student Matthew Shepard near Laramie, Wyoming, was attributed to anti-gay bigotry. Most public opinion polls reveal continuing evidence of this form of bigotry (Herek 2000). Shepard’s bigoted murderers were highly prejudiced toward gay people. Other examples of well-known bigots include David Duke, the former leader of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan; Nazi chancellor of Germany Adolph Hitler (1889-1945); and French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen.” Ref

Damien Marie AtHope, “So, your claim is not mentioned in the STUDIES OF BIGOTRY, how odd right? So, prove it or I will assume your claim unsupported as I do now.”

Challenger. “When, Damien, was “Disagreement with Damien’s Unsupported Assertion” become a logical error? Your opinions are not evidence. Leave that method to the believers.”

Damien Marie AtHope, “So, no support for the claim, “that we should not give bigotry a name as you hold (it would seem) that to do so dignifies the bigotry to you, right? You sir, have a burden of proof or I can stand term your claim is unsupported.”

Challenger. “I gavw an opinion, which you called a logical error on the sole grounds that it disagreed with yours. Yours was the origibal claim. Your otininal claim was unsupported anf merely a neologism. y disagreement was not a claim, it was an opinion and you seem to have developed n aversion to people disgreeing with you and resort to ad hominem responses by clling opinions other than yours “logical errors”, despite no ;ogical error having been committed. You aredeveloping double standards. I di not make a claim. I disagreed with your claim. You clearly do not undersdttnd “Burden of Proof”, any more.

Damien Marie AtHope, “you gave a logically inconsistent claim that you seem to not feel you can support with facts, so please provide supporting evidence for your claim? “burden of proof: is the obligation to prove one’s assertion”

Challenger. “Damien, I.DID.NOT.MAKE.AN.ASSERTION! YOU did, and you did so without any support. I merely pointed out some pitfalls in your unsupported assertion and you got upset.”

Damien Marie AtHope, “Your, claim “Don’t dignify religious bigotry by giving it a name that does not explicitly refer to religious bigotry.”

Challenger. “WHERE IS THE CLAIM? It is an opinion that I think it is wrong to dignify religious bigotry by calling it something else. My opinion is not an an unsupported assertion, nor foes its failure to agree with your wholly unsupported, original assertion, make it a logical error. Why the hissy fit?”

Damien Marie AtHope, “Your point of, “Don’t dignify” (this is claiming that something is or can happen an assertion/claim). “

Challenger. “As “don’t dignify” is merely an English form of an imperative verb, it is neither logically nor linguistically possible that it is a claim. As it is not a claim, it cannot suffer from being unsupported, nor is it in need ot proof. It was, as has ben gently explained to you, an opinion, trying to point out, in a civil manner, the possible pitfalls of the neologism. Because it is not a claim, your ad hominem response of accusing me of logical error, based solely upon your dislake of a non-sycophantic reaction to your post, displays a serius failure of understanding the nature or logic. Please do not merely cut-and-paste a response as it is important that you demonstrate that you understand the difference between an opinion and a claim. Claiming that something WILL happen is a claim. Oferring the opinion that something MIGHT happen is an ppinion.”

Damien Marie AtHope, “Ok, then help me understand your thinking better now, so now after pointing out that “claim you made” that you now say “it” doesn’t mean what you said it is only a merely an English form of an imperative verb? So, you do believe in the necessity for different terms like racism or not?

Challenger. “What I said was that it might be worthwhile considering the possible pitfalls of applying a neologism to something which already has a name. Religious bigotry does not, imnsho, need another name as it is already well covered by the concepts of religious bigotry and religious privilege. The connotations of a “phobia” are such that the one afflicted with it is deserving of special attention and treatment and compassion. Whilst you and I, and other thinking people might not fall prey to this, the religious might find it useful to justify their bigotry by thinking of themselves as the victims of a phobia. The victim of a phobia is, in psychological terms, the one who is afflicted with the phobia and who should receive treatment to be relieved of it. For reasons of the correct use of the term “phobia”, which most people have forgotten, my comment was a polite invitation to consider the possible pitfalls. Please, Damien, not the “-ism” red herring, again. The other aspect of a “phobia” is that is is too often seen as a reaction to something which society considers to be of questionable vale – spiders, loneliness, etc – and to loosely bandy the suffix “-phobia” about, with little forethought could result in the opposite of the intended effect, such that Atheophobia results in Atheists becoming even more marginalized and hated by society. My suggestions are not knee-jerk, reactionary responses, but considered opinions, arrived at using techniques taught to me both by lawyers (my father’s original profession) and scientists (my revered lecturers at university). They were never meant to provoke anger, on;y thought and comment.”

Damien Marie AtHope, “What do you mean by “-ism” red herring?”

Challenger. “Damien. Goofnight & Goodbye. It is not possible to have in intelligent conversation with you as you seem constitutionally, linguistically and intellectually incapable of distinguishing between a claim and an opinion. These deficiencies of yours do go some way to explaining why you consider an opinion which dies not align with yours to be a logicl error.”

Damien Marie AtHope, “So, you are saying you only have a personal “”opinion”” not something you hold as true so your opinion,

“Don’t dignify religious bigotry by giving it a name that does not explicitly refer to religious bigotry.”

Damien Marie AtHope, “So, that is only a personal, not a truth statement, to you it’s just something you believe and is necessarily not open to proof or disproof.?

Let’s begin with opinion.

“An opinion is a self-report of feelings or personal judgment, e.g., I’m thirsty.  Opinions often contain clue words pointing to oneself, e.g., I think, I believe, I feel, in my opinion.  Sometimes, however, a self-report is smuggled into a statement with an adjective indicating an attitude or emotion.  For example, if I say, “This is a nasty day,” I’m not really describing the objective day in the real world, but rather expressing my emotion that the day is unpleasant, which is equivalent to saying, “I’m not pleased about the day,” a self-report. There is no need to argue against opinions when they are recognized as self-reports rather than as claims about the real world.  It would be ridiculous to argue, “You are wrong–you really are not thirsty,” or “In fact, the day actually is pleasant.”  We accept self-reports of emotion or attitude as unassailable because we have no basis for questioning them. For this reason, opinions (self-reports) don’t count for much when someone is trying to persuade you.  You can always answer, “I have a different opinion.”  Accordingly, it is correct that we are all entitled to our opinions because ordinarily, no one else has sufficient data to question our self-reports.  Moreover, since opinions are not claims about the real world, they are usually inconsequential.”

Damien Marie AtHope, “Am I wrong that you feel no need to give evidence to “Support” your claims which to me you wrongly call just options; when it sure seems, you assure you self-titled options as truth-statements? Unless, I miss understand and you were not offering your statements as truth? Or is it another non-truth statement.

So, this statement you started all this with, “Don’t dignify religious bigotry by giving it a name that does not explicitly refer to religious bigotry” is not making any truth statement (a claim) but a personal option that you don’t assort as a truth but to you? “Don’t dignify religious bigotry by giving it a name that does not explicitly refer to religious bigotry.”

You said, “Claiming that something WILL happen is a claim. Oferring the opinion that something MIGHT happen is an opinion”, is just just another claim you choose to not support; as it is nothing more than a personal opinion to you not you making a truth statement?

“Let’s look at the facts.”

What an Opinion is:

—Twinkies are delicious.

—I like dance music.

—I think Virginia Woolf is better than James Joyce.

—The governor is a bad man.

What a Claim Is:

—A claim is the main argument of an essay. It is probably the single most important part of an academic paper. The complexity, effectiveness, and quality of the entire paper hinges on the claim. If your claim is boring or obvious, the rest of the paper probably will be too.

—A claim defines your paper’s goals, direction, scope, and exigence and is supported by evidence, quotations, argumentation, expert opinion, statistics, and telling details.

—A claim must be argumentative. When you make a claim, you are arguing for a certain interpretation or understanding of your subject.

—A good claim is specific. It makes a focused argument (MTV‟s popularity is waning because it no longer plays music videos) rather than a general one (MTV sucks).

Damien Marie AtHope, “here is my claim, “Atheophobia (Noun) “Fear or hatred of atheism or atheists” Antonyms: religiophobia and theophobia. Origin: atheo- (“a- + theo-”) +‎ -phobia” Ref

So, is there “Atheophobia”, well lets look at discrimination against atheists, well such fear and hate is well documented both at present and historically, includes the persecution of those identifying themselves or labeled by others as atheists, as well as the discrimination against them. Discrimination against atheists may also refer to and comprise the negative attitudes towards, prejudice, hostility, hatred, fear, and/or intolerance towards atheists and/or atheism. As atheism can be defined in various ways, those discriminated against or persecuted on the grounds of being atheists might not have been considered as such in a different time or place. As of 2015, 19 countries punish their citizens for apostasy, and in 13 of those countries it is punishable by death. In some Islamic countries, atheists face persecution and severe penalties such as the withdrawal of legal status or, in the case of apostasy, capital punishment. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is designed to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. In 1993, the UN’s human rights committee declared that article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief.” Ref

General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Art. 18) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4:

1. The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which includes the freedom to hold beliefs) in article 18.1 is far-reaching and profound; it encompasses freedom of thought on all matters, personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief, whether manifested individually or in community with others. The Committee draws the attention of States parties to the fact that the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience are protected equally with the freedom of religion and belief. The fundamental character of these freedoms is also reflected in the fact that this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of public emergency, as stated in article 4.2 of the Covenant.

2. Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion” are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility on the part of a predominant religious community.

3. Article 18 distinguishes the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief from the freedom to manifest religion or belief. It does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice. These freedoms are protected unconditionally, as is the right of everyone to hold opinions without interference in article 19.1. In accordance with articles 18.2 and 17, no one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief.

4. The freedom to manifest religion or belief may be exercised “either individually or in community with others and in public or private”. The freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching encompasses a broad range of acts. The concept of worship extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief, as well as various practices integral to such acts, including the building of places of worship, the use of ritual formulae and objects, the display of symbols, and the observance of holidays and days of rest. The observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or headcoverings, participation in rituals associated with certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a group. In addition, the practice and teaching of religion or belief includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as the freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.

5. The Committee observes that the freedom to “have or to adopt” a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18.2 bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert. Policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for example, those restricting access to education, medical care, employment or the rights guaranteed by article 25 and other provisions of the Covenant, are similarly inconsistent with article 18.2. The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.

6. The Committee is of the view that article 18.4 permits public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics if it is given in a neutral and objective way. The liberty of parents or legal guardians to ensure that their children receive a religious and moral education in conformity with their own convictions, set forth in article 18.4, is related to the guarantees of the freedom to teach a religion or belief stated in article 18.1. The Committee notes that public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with article 18.4 unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians.

7. In accordance with article 20, no manifestation of religion or belief may amount to propaganda for war or advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. As stated by the Committee in its General Comment 11 [19], States parties are under the obligation to enact laws to prohibit such acts.

8. Article 18.3 permits restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion or belief only if limitations are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The freedom from coercion to have or to adopt a religion or belief and the liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted. In interpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, States parties should proceed from the need to protect the rights guaranteed under the Covenant, including the right to equality and non-discrimination on all grounds specified in articles 2, 3 and 26. Limitations imposed must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18. The Committee observes that paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security. Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. Restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner. The Committee observes that the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition. Persons already subject to certain legitimate constraints, such as prisoners, continue to enjoy their rights to manifest their religion or belief to the fullest extent compatible with the specific nature of the constraint. States parties’ reports should provide information on the full scope and effects of limitations under article 18.3, both as a matter of law and of their application in specific circumstances.

9. The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant, including articles 18 and 27, nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers. In particular, certain measures discriminating against the latter, such as measures restricting eligibility for government service to members of the predominant religion or giving economic privileges to them or imposing special restrictions on the practice of other faiths, are not in accordance with the prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief and the guarantee of equal protection under article 26. The measures contemplated by article 20, paragraph 2 of the Covenant constitute important safeguards against infringement of the rights of religious minorities and of other religious groups to exercise the rights guaranteed by articles 18 and 27, and against acts of violence or persecution directed towards those groups. The Committee wishes to be informed of measures taken by States parties concerned to protect the practices of all religions or beliefs from infringement and to protect their followers from discrimination. Similarly, information as to respect for the rights of religious minorities under article 27 is necessary for the Committee to assess the extent to which the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief has been implemented by States parties. States parties concerned should also include in their reports information relating to practices considered by their laws and jurisprudence to be punishable as blasphemous.

10. If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not result in any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 or any other rights recognized under the Covenant nor in any discrimination against persons who do not accept the official ideology or who oppose it.

11. Many individuals have claimed the right to refuse to perform military service (conscientious objection) on the basis that such right derives from their freedoms under article 18. In response to such claims, a growing number of States have in their laws exempted from compulsory military service citizens who genuinely hold religious or other beliefs that forbid the performance of military service and replaced it with alternative national service. The Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious objection, but the Committee believes that such a right can be derived from article 18, inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief. When this right is recognized by law or practice, there shall be no differentiation among conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their particular beliefs; likewise, there shall be no discrimination against conscientious objectors because they have failed to perform military service. The Committee invites States parties to report on the conditions under which persons can be exempted from military service on the basis of their rights under article 18 and on the nature and length of alternative national service. Ref