First What is a god?
 
We as thinkers should ask first “what is a god?” before you address does a god exist. We also help believers by asking this question allowing them a chance to think about it as well. If we move too fast and forget to ask “What do you mean by the term god?” don’t help them coming up with any answer as to do this can stop them from having to think, “hey do I really know that a god is?”, let them sweet on it. I know not them nor anyone can give a truly valid claim of god that can not at some point not be reducible to a empty act of faith especially faith claims in holy books that themselves are full of wild unfounded claims about their god claim of choice, as there is no ontology of the term god so give a good ontology of god and then how you are claiming to know it. gOD-thinkers seem to believe befor thinking. The god thinkers are closed thinkers and are not being open/scientific thinkers on the god term, not at all they start with beliefs and look into the world striving to prove what they already believed before they started thinking or looking. So it’s no surprise they see their propositional god thinking is everywhere and in everything, such a conformation basis confution about the real world that is godless. I am a truth seeker and see no truth in any god term claims as anything real and instead are magical thinking superstitions.
 
PS. A good ontology of god would be the basic categories of being and their relations. But you cannot just claim basic categories you must demonstrate them to be justified, true and provable to the specific categories of being and their relations being offered.

The term god is at best a unjustified claim, not even a valid hypnosis to me.
 
“A hypothesis is a statement, not a question. The hypothesis is an educated, testable prediction about what will happen. Make it clear. A good hypothesis is written in clear and simple language.”
 
Hypotheses Tips?
 
ScienceBuddies.com staff scientists offer the following tips for thinking about and writing good hypotheses.
 
*The question comes first. Before you make a hypothesis, you have to clearly identify the question you are interested in studying.
*A hypothesis is a statement, not a question. Your hypothesis is not the scientific question in your project. The hypothesis is an educated, testable prediction about what will happen.
*Make it clear. A good hypothesis is written in clear and simple language. Reading your hypothesis should tell a teacher or judge exactly what you thought was going to happen when you started your project.
*Keep the variables in mind. A good hypothesis defines the variables in easy-to-measure terms, like who the participants are, what changes during the testing, and what the effect of the changes will be. (For more information about identifying variables, see: Variables in Your Science Fair Project.)
*Make sure your hypothesis is “testable.” To prove or disprove your hypothesis, you need to be able to do an experiment and take measurements or make observations to see how two things (your variables) are related. You should also be able to repeat your experiment over and over again, if necessary.
*To create a “testable” hypothesis make sure you have done all of these things:
 
-Thought about what experiments you will need to carry out to do the test.
-Identified the variables in the project.
-Included the independent and dependent variables in the hypothesis statement. (This helps ensure that your statement is specific enough.
 
*Do your research. You may find many studies similar to yours have already been conducted. What you learn from available research and data can help you shape your project and hypothesis.
*Don’t bite off more than you can chew! Answering some scientific questions can involve more than one experiment, each with its own hypothesis. Make sure your hypothesis is a specific statement relating to a single experiment. Ref

No possibility of a god existing?
 

“Damien, you say there is no possibility of a god existing? Wouldn’t we need to be all knowing?” – Questioner

Damien Marie Athope, “no, that sounds like an agnostic/skepticism confusion and I am an ignostic rationalist knowing “possibility” is the state or fact of being likely or possible; likelihood. The term god is at best a unjustified claim, not even a valid hypnosis to me  without any likelihood, feel otherwise prove a valid and reliable ontology of the term god and how you can claim to know anything about the empty term god outside of empty claims.”

An Agnostic is often an Atheist but doesn’t realize it?

An agnostic is often a person that does not know that they are an Atheist and if they don’t like that then choose which one you are because you either are one or the other. Saying you don’t know which one you believe is avoiding the question as one either accepts or rejects. If you don’t care about the question, then you are an Apatheist but even then, one has rejected a choice of believing, thus, is an Atheist. Try and demonstrate how you can discern a full possibility argument of a complete “unknown” with no evidence to even state with or even a hope to grasp a possible ontology of what a god label could even involve without any reality support?

“What about if one is incapable of making a decision on if there is a god aren’t they just an agnostic and not at all an atheist?” – Questioner

My response, “So, you don’t believe it or you don’t know about it, thus, you can’t believe it therefore, by design don’t believe, thus are an atheist of some kind. Only belief, is not atheism; it doesn’t matter the level or reasoning you don’t or can’t believe if you are not in some way believing then the default is you don’t believe thus when given the question, do you believe the answer is not then you are an atheist and there are all kinds of atheist thinking or conclusions. Atheism is descriptive not prescriptive of a universal given thinking, but that there is a lack of belief in the do you believe in god(s).”

“Damien, how can you say God(s) is not even possible?” – Challenger

My response, “well, for a thing to be assessed as possible it needs a starting point in reality, the man-made God concepts not only don’t have such tangibility they can’t even justify what a god actually could be other that state regurgitating wishful thinking stories that involve empty unwarranted claims of supernatural beings with supernaturalism caricaturists devoid of any supporting demonstrable or testable evidence. So, saying that you know or hold open to possibility is to be posturing from ignorance as you not only don’t know anything about non-natural things (no one rightly can) you likewise do nor justifiability can say what if anything could be beyond the natural world as that is all we have. Thus, saying one believes that some God, any God is real or possible is wrong until evidence of supernatural anything is proven.”

Agnostic Arguments on “possibility” are “knowledge claims”

Stating a possibility, is to state a “knowledge claim” of the possible (something related to or in reality), meaning if justifiable it must connect to that which would support such a claim. So, how can anyone truly say a god (unknown and evidenceless assumed thing, only expressed by imagination) could be possible as some agnostics seem to do? Agnostic arguments on “possibility” are actually making “knowledge claims” while trying to claim they lack knowledge, nice try but that is confused in its reasoning. Moreover possibility is a noun, a thing that may happen or be the case. But how can you define what “may happen or be the case” if you know nothing about it in reality, when addressing the possibility of a thing in reality?

According to the definition of a deductive argument, the author of a deductive argument always intends that the premises provide the sort of justification for the conclusion whereby if the premises are true, the conclusion is guaranteed to be true as well. Loosely speaking, if the author’s process of reasoning is a good one, if the premises actually do provide this sort of justification for the conclusion, then the argument is valid. In effect, an argument is valid if the truth of the premises logically guarantees the truth of the conclusion. The following argument is valid, because it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false:

Elizabeth owns either a Honda or a Saturn.

Elizabeth does not own a Honda.

Therefore, Elizabeth owns a Saturn.

It is important to stress that the premises of an argument do not have actually to be true in order for the argument to be valid. http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

Bigfoots, Unicorns, and Gods the rational conclusion using axiology

So how do we form rational conclusions? More importantly how do we differentiate between the levels involved to establish a conclusions rational viability.

It takes axiology or the value judgment the worthiness or lack thereof in relation to the available reason and evidence.

So let’s start with the axiological viability of Bigfoots

There is no available evidence for Bigfoots.

But is their proposition outside of reason?

Always start in reality from the evidence we do know, such as a primate/nonhuman hominid close to that of both humans and other nonhuman primates is not entirely outside all possibility of reason even though lacking all evidence. Therefore, belief is not warrant and the axiological worthiness of possibility is low enough to motivate disbelief.

The axiological viability of Unicorns (ie. a horse with a single horn on its head)

There is no evidence for Unicorns.

But is their proposition outside of reason?

As always start in reality from the evidence we do know, such as by looking at the evolution of the horse not once was there a horn on any of the several stages of animals to the horse we know today. So it is relatively outside of possibility though as it is still only claiming non fantastic attributes it is only somewhat ridiculous. Therefore, belief is not in any way warranted and the axiological worthiness is so low to highly support disbelief.

Now the axiological validity of God(s)

There is no evidence for Gods.

But is their proposition outside of reason?

As always start in reality from the evidence we do know, such as never in the history of scientific research or investigation has any supernatural claims shown to be true. So it is completely outside of possibility and is utterly ridiculous. Therefore, belief should be rejected as there are no warrants at all and it is axiologically unworthy to such a preponderance to demand disbelief.


Damien Marie AtHope’s Scale of Theistic and Nontheistic Assumptions
 
1. Weakest implicit Nontheistic/Atheism “negative” / “weak” / “soft” nonbelief includes infants or babies who do not believe or do not know that a deity or deities exist and agnostics who have not explicitly rejected or eschewed such a belief (absence of religious motivation).
 
2. Strong implicit Atheism “negative” / “weak” / “soft” nonbelief include apatheist atheists who are not interested in gods exist claims agnostics who explicitly rejected that one can make a choice in god beliefs.
3. Weak Explicit Atheism “negative” / “weak” / “soft” atheists but unsure they can fully reject a belief that any deities exist, some call this agnostic atheism.
 
4. Strong Explicit Atheism “negative” / “weak” / “soft” atheists either reject the god concept or week conscious rejection of belief any deities some could call this ignostic atheism.
5. Strongest Explicit Atheism “positive” / “strong” / “hard” atheists assert that it is false that any deities exist or at least one, many deities don’t exist or a strong conscious rejection of belief, one or any deities some could call this antitheist atheism.
 
6. Weakest implicit Theistic thinking/Theism “negative” / “weak” / “soft” belief includes small children who are indoctrinated and don’t know or understand what and why they believe, only believe as told to believe or those who believe in deism, pantheism, vague theism, or somethingism as possibilities of god beliefs (absence of full religious motivation).
 
7. Weak implicit Theism “negative” / “weak” / “soft” belief includes apatheist theists who kind of believe but are not that interested in existence claims or agnostics who are open to god beliefs but are unsure if they should believe.
 
8. Weak Explicit Theism “negative” / “weak” / “soft” theists some beliefs but unsure they can fully accept a belief that one or any deities exist some call this agnostic theism.
 
9. Strong Explicit Theism “positive” / “strong” / “hard” theists either generally accept the god(s) concept(s) or week conscious accepting of belief in one, many or any deities, some could call this standard theism.
 
10. Strongest Explicit Theism “positive” / “strong” / “hard” theists assert that at least one deity exists or strong conscious belief in one, many or any deities, some could call this gnostic theism.

Reasons for or Types of Atheism

I will now offer helpful but simplistic definitions of why a position of atheism could be chosen it is of course just an over generalization but it will highlight the main idea though it always will be more substantive in reality and who is applying it.

Adeist atheism: as you can see, we are dealing with a negative definition, an antonym, just like the words a-theist and a-symmetric. Deism is the belief that a supreme being created the universe and is no longer interfering, intervening or interacting with the universe or laws of nature (no miracles, revelations etc.) and an a-deist, rejects deism or does not share the beliefs of the deist most likely denies a supreme being created the universe exists or ever existed. Adeism is the position of unbelief, or non-belief in the existence of any God or supernatural being. 1

Agnostic atheism: addresses the issue of what one knows or claims to know about the existence of god/gods. Asserts an inability of any claim about the existence of god or nonexistence, Agnostic atheists are usually individuals who claim no one can know if or prove there is or is not a god, does not believe any god exists, but doesn’t claim to know whether this is actually true. In some cases, the agnostic atheism will assert that the answers to questions about the existence of gods are unknown and unknowable so the questions are essentially meaningless as “god” is ill-defined. 1

Analytical atheism: comes to disbelief because of deliberative analytical thinking on the god concepts. Psychologists believe that humans process information in two main ways: some thought processes are more intuitive and automatic, whilst others are more analytical and deliberative. In studies it has been shown that religious and supernatural beliefs are associated mostly with intuition and deliberative analytical thinking is less likely to hold religious and supernatural beliefs. 1

Anarchy atheism: advocate of freethought and anti-religious activism. If you don’t believe any god should control you, you shouldn’t believe any other human being should believe in a sky king or supernatural master and more than human kings or masters. An anarchist would most likely be atheist, anti-theist, agnostic or apatheist believing there should be no rulers thus reject god whether they think one does or doesn’t exist. Certainly excludes rulers like gods, kings, or the state. Anarchy atheism likewise could be anti-religion as well seeing parallels between organized religion external control instead of the individual (even if god was removed) and the state (the primary target of most anarchists) are striking thus rejected. Politicians and preachers are one and the same: both work for a higher power than you, money and power. Ultimately, anarchy to atheism, goes past a simple atheism tendency to only attack god, while ignoring the state, capital, and other possible forms of domination, when anarchy atheists believe they have to attack all of it. 1

Antagonist atheism: someone who doesn’t just think that God does not exists but actively goes out of their way to openly ridicule or otherwise attack peoples having faith. Antagonist atheism would be excessive mocking of people and ideas many out spoken atheists may attack thinking but this is more confrontational to people. “New Atheists” actively assert that God does not exist and “evangelize” their worldview. Some who employ Antagonist atheism could be termed “Hatetheists” this is not to say all Antagonist atheism are or that many new atheists who often desire to antagonize go as far as becoming Hatetheists. to describe those who cannot help but espouse their hatred (not just disagreement) with people in theism.  Despite its alliterative charm ‘antagonistic atheism’ seems like a tag invented by those proponents of religion who cannot tackle atheistic arguments head on. 1 2

Anticlerical atheism: disbelief from an opposing or clergy for reasons including their actual or alleged power and influence in all aspects of public and political life and their involvement in the everyday life of the citizen, their privileges, or their enforcement of orthodoxy. Philosophy of atheism built on an attacked the religious claim of leadership and holiness thus claiming things like saints, holy persons or priests are oppressive classism and morally corrupt so if divined by a god then there can be no god. Anticlerical atheism would say the clerics live like kings or god in freedom while we live in bondage and poverty oppressed by their imposed sin and the requirement to give them our money! 1

Antireligionist atheism: is opposition to any religion, religious beliefs, religious institutions, and god myths. Antireligion is distinct from atheism and antitheism (opposition to belief in deities), although antireligionists may be atheists or antitheists. The term may be used to describe opposition to mostly organized religions, or can describe a broader opposition to any form of belief in the supernatural, holy, godly or divine. 1

Apistevist atheism: an atheist is one who is not a theist, one who is not a believer; an agnostic is one who lacks knowledge; apistevist is the term for one who lacks or denies faith, especially of the religious or superstition variety. I happen to know many people who are hard-core theists and insist that their faith is rational, based on things they see as evidence supporting or convincing what they feel is a need for religious faith. Then there are others religious believers who go the route of pure and simple faith without feeling the need for evidence. Apistevist atheist rejects how many theists arguing for their beliefs coming from faith alone even if believers think it has some kind of evidence. 1

Axiological atheism: is a constructive Value centered ethics driven atheism which rejects the existence of gods in favor of a “higher absolute,” such as humanity and society. This form of atheism favors humanity as the absolute source of ethics and values, and permits individuals to resolve moral problems without resorting to faith or god myths. Axiological or constructive atheism conveys messages of liberation, full-development, and unfettered happiness. Axiological or constructive atheism life meaning in humanity, ethics and values surpasses one of the most common criticisms of atheism that denying the existence of a god leads to moral relativism, leaving one with no moral or ethical foundation or renders life meaningless and miserable. 1

Emotional atheism: are the kinds of unbelievers who, due to some unfortunate personal tragedy or thwarted desires, and see that god appears to do nothing, often come to doubt not only the benevolence, but not the very existence of god. How could people be angry with God if they did not believe in God? Just like God unicorns are believed to not exist but who has ever been angry at unicorns? The issue is they are not really being logical to be angry directly to a god they don’t believe in, if they do it’s not atheism it’s maybe angry theism or some other variant. Emotional atheism can be genuine doubt though its hate can be confused as angry theism (most likely by believers) instead their hate of god concepts or hate of unlikely gods they most likely don’t acknowledge. A study found that faith was least likely to recover if anger toward God was the cause of their loss of belief. In other words, anger toward God may not only lead people to atheism but give them a reason to cling to their disbelief. 1

Empiricism atheism: empiricism is an epistemological theory which argues that that all knowledge must be acquired a posteriori and that nothing can be known a priori. Another way of putting it is that empiricism denies the existence of purely intellectual knowledge and argues that only sense-knowledge can exist. Empiricism is a common philosophical belief among many atheists. They believe that empirical science is the only true path to understanding. If you cannot see it, smell it, taste it, hear it, etc., it cannot be known. Empiricism atheists say that if you cannot prove something empirically, such as the existence of God, you are irrational for believing it. 1 2

Epistemological atheism: highlights a branch of philosophy that deals with determining what is and what is not true, and why we believe or disbelieve what we or others do. On one hand, this is begging the question of having the ability to measure “truth” – as though there is an “external” something that one measures against. From this atheist orientation, there is no, nor has there ever been, nor will there ever be, any “external” something so there can be no god-concept. Many debates between atheist and theists revolve around fundamental issues which people don’t recognize or never get around to discussing. Many of these are epistemological in nature: in disagreeing about whether it’s reasonable to believe in the existence of god, to believe in miracles, to accept revelation and scriptures as authoritative, and so forth, atheists and theists are ultimately disagreeing about basic epistemological principles. Without understanding this and understanding the various epistemological positions, people will just end up talking past each other. it’s common for Epistemological atheism to differ in what they consider to be appropriate criteria for truth and, therefore, the proper criteria for a reasonable disbelief. 1

Ethical atheism: ethics must be equally applied or the concept of ethics has no ethical meaning to begin with. Ethical atheism could be seen as thinking that if the idea of god implies the abdication of human reason and justice; it is the most decisive negation against of human rights, dignity, and liberty. Therefore ethical atheism holds a necessarily requirement to disbelief in order to end such unethical thinking and to end a god only morality enslavement of mankind. Ethical atheism holds all to ethical standards therefor if god did exist, it would be necessary to abolish him so we could be freely utilize human rights, dignity, reason and justice. Ethical atheism promotes atheism because it is both the logical and the ethical position to take in a world where religious people fly planes into skyscrapers, blow themselves up on crowded busses, and do all sorts of horrible things in the name of an imaginary sky monster. 1

Evidential atheism: thinks that whether or not belief in a divine being is epistemically acceptable will be determined by the evidence. I intend to treat “evidence” in a broad sense including a priori arguments, arguments to the best explanation, inductive and empirical reasons, as well as deductive and conceptual premises. (Also note that one could be an evidentialist theist.) The evidentialist theist and the evidentialist atheist may have a number of general epistemological principles concerning evidence, arguments, implication in common, but then disagree about what the evidence is, how it should be understood, and what it implies. They may disagree, for instance, about whether the values of the physical constants and laws in nature constitute evidence for intentional fine tuning, but agree that whether God exists is a matter that can be explored empirically. 1

Existential atheism: existentialism in general says nature and life do not have an objective purpose or meaning other than those we choose or create for ourselves. Existential atheism would thus assert a god concept is invented outside of life thus just a nonsense choice. An existential atheism challenges religious thinking showing it not even worthy of challenging to begin with because it is so meaningless in its reality irrelevant to truth or critical thought. Existential atheism would say there is no reason to believe in things like gods, flying monkeys or pink elephants exist, nor any requirement to prove they don’t. Only a fool believes something just because someone claims that a lack of belief makes you a fool. Existential atheism sees meaningless of a religion in concept it claims to provide a salvation from the guilt and punishment it created in the first place that without religion there is no longer a need to have salvation because of the removing of the inventor of the guilt and punishment to begin with so one is better off without religion in the first place. The term atheistic existentialism refers to the exclusion of any transcendental, metaphysical, or religious beliefs from philosophical existentialist thought. 1

Experiential atheism: The second type of argument commonly advanced against the doctrine of divine omniscience is the problem of experiential knowledge. This is that there appear to be certain kinds of knowledge that can only be acquired by having certain kinds of experiences. The Problem of Experiential Knowledge: (1) There are some items of knowledge that can only be acquired through experience. (2) Some of the experiences through which items of knowledge that can only be acquired through experience are acquired are such that they cannot be had by God. (3) If some of the experiences through which items of knowledge that can only be acquired through experience are acquired are such that they cannot be had by God, then there are some items of knowledge that cannot be acquired by God. Therefore: (4) There are some items of knowledge that cannot be acquired by God. (5) If there are some items of knowledge that cannot be acquired by God then it is not the case that God is omniscient. Therefore: (6) It is not the case that God is omniscient. 1

Feminist atheism: is a momentum within feminism that advocates atheism, opposing religion and its manly make gods as a main source of female oppression and inequality, believing that the majority of the religions are sexist and oppressive to women. Atheist feminists object to the fact that women are not eligible to be equal members as well. 1

Gnostic (anti-agnostic) atheism: addresses the issue of what one knows or claims to know about the existence of god/gods. Denies any claim about the existence of god, gnostic atheists are individuals who claim to know that the claim there is no god can be demonstrated as true. Typically, the claim of god as disprovable and all belief in or knowledge about god is esoteric and mostly attributed to divine revelation myths claimed in manmade holy writing. In some cases, the gnostic atheism will assert that this knowledge of gods nonexistence is available through historical, logical, theoretical, empirical or scientific evidence etc. tend to believe in rationalism, are critical of any belief system that demands from people faith or simple acceptance instead of relying on reasoning and critical thinking. Atheists of this type, including Goldman, argue that religion and belief in God are not just irrational, or unreasonable, but also destructive and harmful because of the influence of religious institutions over people’s lives. 1

Humanist atheism: humanist atheism is most likely secular humanism with atheism added. Secular humanism is alternatively known by some adherents as Humanism, specifically with a capital H to distinguish it from other forms of lowercase humanism. Humanist atheism embraces human reason, ethics, social justice and philosophical naturalism, while specifically rejecting religious dogma, supernaturalism, pseudoscience or superstition as the basis of morality and decision making. Humanism is a philosophical and ethical stance that emphasizes the value and agency of human beings, individually and collectively, and generally prefers critical thinking and evidence (rationalism, empiricism) over established doctrine or faith (fideism). Generally, humanism refers to a perspective that affirms some notion of human freedom and progress. In modern times, humanist movements are typically aligned with secularism, and today “Humanism” typically refers to a non-theistic life stance centered on human agency, and looking to science instead of religious dogma in order to understand the world. Humanist atheism believes there is a need to hold disbelief on the god question because most concepts god holds that god is the only giver or definer of rights, ethical, justice or truth. Thus Humanist atheism assorts only disbelief and god removal in relevance can then embrace human reason, ethics, and social justice. Humanistic atheism values human reality in naturalism, rejecting religious dogma, supernaturalism, pseudoscience or superstition as the basis of social morality and human decision making. It posits that human beings are capable of being ethical and moral without religion or a god. It does not, however, assume that humans are either inherently evil or innately good, nor does it present humans as being superior to nature. 1  2

Ignostic atheism: ignosticism is similar to agnosticism, but where agnosticism is the claim that you can’t know something (god), ignosticism is the claim that, if the definition of something (god) is incoherent, then it can’t be meaningfully discussed, and if the definition of something (god) is unfalsifiable, then it has no meaning. Ignosticism or igtheism is the idea that every theological position assumes too much about the concept of God and other theological concepts. Ignosticism could possibly be one of the best argument against god concepts ever as it sees all efforts surrounding existence of a God concept semantically twisting the definition of God to mean that which is incomprehensible. If God is incoherent then the experiences believers attribute to God are by extension unintelligible and therefore meaningless. In which case you void any and all purported experiences of God because you couldn’t comprehend them. Ignostic atheism holds two interrelated views about to reject all God concepts. They are as follows: 1) The view that a coherent definition of God must be presented before the question of the existence of god can be meaningfully discussed. 2) If the definition provided is unfalsifiable, the Ignostic atheist takes the theological noncognitivist position that the question of the existence of a God concept is rendered meaningless thus must stay refuted. As with any topic, and especially in the realm of the supernatural and woo, the subject of any debate should be coherently defined. If one offers a clear definition of an entity, then in order to take a position whether it exists or not the definition of the entity must be one in which its existence can be falsified (there is a rational and logical method by which we can test the existence of the subject as it has been defined). Few theists ever offer a clear definition of God. The few who do offer a definition almost never offer one in which the existence of that God could be tested. The rare falsifiable definition offered regarding God’s existence is easily falsified. And so as with any subject (such as the existence of almost all supernatural entities) debate about the existence of God is, for the far majority of such conversations, pointless. 1 2 3

Investigative atheism: investigative atheism may take some interest in showing how the skeptical theistic way of reasoning, brought into the larger flow of total evidence skepticism, can be used to expose certain additional sources of doubt about theism sufficient to prevent overhasty migration to theism on the part of those left unconvinced by atheism. Moreover, and more positively, it can be used to inspire a greater openness to new religiously-relevant investigative results in the future. With these thoughts in mind, let’s add two more skeptical theses to our list: We have no good reason for thinking that the arguments from horrors or hiddenness against theism we know of are representative, relative to the property of (potentially) constituting a successful proof that theism is false, of the arguments from horrors or hiddenness against theism there are. And we have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of are representative, relative to the property of consistency with a person being axiologically ultimate, of the possible goods there are but are always investigating and open. 1

Logical atheism: logical atheism holds that the various conceptions of gods, such as the personal god, are ascribed logically inconsistent qualities. Such atheists present deductive arguments against the existence of God, which assert the incompatibility between certain traits, such as perfection, creator-status, immutability, omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, transcendence, personhood (a personal being), nonphysicality, justice, and mercy.   Logical arguments for atheism attempt to show that the concept of god is self-contradictory with some known fact. These incompatible-properties arguments attempt to demonstrate a contradiction in the concept of God. If an argument of this type were successful, it would mean that the existence of god is utterly impossible; there is a 0% probability that gods exists. 1 2

Materialistic atheism:  materialists most likely value physicalism and may say that morality and concepts of god evolved thus extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence so god is not reality nor is such myths authoritative. Atheists are usually materialists of some sort, rejecting the idea that there exists anything independent of the workings of matter and energy. Materialism often entails atheism unless a person believes in a purely physical god, but atheism does not entail materialism. It may be hard to believe in a god in a materialistic philosophy, but an atheistic philosophy need not be materialistic. Materialistic atheism could involve an individualistic thinking earthier consciously or subconsciously to fulfill a survival of the fittest “things” or “needs” (to consume or accumulate) in order to “survive” are a value physicalism requires since you are the only thing you can count on, knowing no god is waiting to help. 1

Metaphysical atheism: metaphysical atheism can include any doctrines that hold to a atheistic metaphysical monism (the homogeneity of reality). Only a metaphysical atheism is based on absolute metaphysical atheism thus subscribe to some degree of physicalism, and explicitly deny the existence of non-physical beings most notably gods. Metaphysical atheism may be either: a) absolute — an explicit denial of God’s existence associated with materialistic monism (all materialistic trends, both in ancient and modern times); b) relative — the implicit denial of God in all philosophies that, while they accept the existence of an absolute, conceive of the absolute as not possessing any of the attributes proper to God: transcendence, a personal character or unity. Relative atheism is associated with idealistic monism (apantheism, pantheism, panentheism, deism). Metaphysical atheism could be the view that a god exists but doesn’t have a mind, which is basically a special type of deism. One important distinction is precisely whether an atheist can be a deist or pantheist. One view of atheism is that no gods can exist. Another view is merely that personal gods don’t exist. 1

Naturalist atheism: naturalist atheism is the philosophical doctrine that the observable physical world is all there is thus there can be no god. Most philosophers of science adhere strictly to this view and positively deny that any supernatural or miraculous effects or forces are possible thus one is almost required to hold a view of atheism. Naturalist atheists are driven by the humility lacking desire to plumb the depths of reality, to know what objectively exists, to understand how things fundamentally work, and to have maximally transparent explanations of phenomena. Naturalist atheism thus is a philo-scientific way of knowing what can justifiably believe which gets us reliable beliefs about the world. Naturalist atheism can be called a philo-scientific epistemology because it combines openness to philosophical critique with a reliance on scientific criteria of explanatory adequacy as vetted by that critique and the actual practice of science. Naturalist atheism holds that science and philosophy are continuous, interpenetrating and collaborative in our investigation of reality; neither is foundational to the other. Naturalist atheism mainly wants not to be deceived by supernatural or divine being claims, or to make errors of logic or method or assumptions when understanding the world which leave open the possibility of a God’s existence. 1

Nihilistic atheism: judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist. According to this view, our existence (action, suffering, willing, feeling) has no meaning and “true morality” is unknown, and secular ethics are impossible; therefore, life has no truth, and no action is known to be preferable to any other. Thus it is incompatible for religion or the concept of a god (won’t accept god, or a moral code based on belief in god) is for people to pursue their “will to power”. Nihilistic atheism presented in the form of existential nihilism, which argues that life is without objective meaning, purpose, or intrinsic value. Moral nihilists assert that morality does not inherently exist, and that any established moral values are abstractly contrived. Nihilism can also take epistemological or ontological/metaphysical forms, meaning respectively that, in some aspect, knowledge is not possible, or that reality does not actually exist. 1

Noncognitivism atheism: is the position that religious language — and specifically religious terms like “god” — are not (cognitively) meaningful. Noncognitivism atheism argues that religious language is not meaningful because its empirical claims cannot be verified, even in theory. Likewise they further think   there are no positive attributes that can be ascribed to entities like “god,” and entities without attributes are meaningless.This means that noncognitivism denies the essential meaningfulness of religious language, religious arguments, and religious apologetics. If they aren’t meaningful, then they can’t be either true or false and believing them to be true is pointless. 1

Non-evidential atheism: goes beyond a limitation in common atheism which likely is using evidentialist theory of knowledge which is any theory of knowledge that says that having evidence for a thing is necessary for knowing that thing. A non-evidentialist theory of knowledge denies this most commonly offering instead two additional non-evidentialist theories of knowledge: the causal theory, and reliabilism. Even if a belief lacks a credible rational it is not automatically irrational it may simply be utilizing a less supported or even wishful idealism stance that may even be somewhat flawed and yet still not irrational which is to be without the faculty of reason or deprived of reason. According to the Causal Theory of Knowledge, the difference between a true belief that isn’t knowledge and a true belief that is amounts to the following: if a true belief that P is knowledge, then it is causally connected to the fact that P. The simplest sort of causal connection would be direct: one where the fact that P is the cause of a subject’s belief that P. Causal connections can also be indirect: perhaps the fact that P causes the fact that Q which causes the subject to believe that P. It allow that you can know P if P is “logically related” to a fact that is causally connected to your believing P. According to the Reliabilism theory of Knowledge, which holds that the difference between mere true belief on the one hand and knowledge on the other is that the latter is formed via a reliable process:  Reliabilism S knows that P if and only if S’s true belief that P was caused by a reliable process. What is a “reliable process”? Well, think of an analogy. A reliable car is one that generally works when you want it to. What “work” do we want our belief-forming processes to do? We want them to form true beliefs. So a reliable belief-forming process is one that generally leads to true beliefs. Reliabilism says that knowledge is true belief that was formed by a process that can generally be relied on to form true beliefs. As long as perception, memory, testimony, and reasoning are reliable in this sense, they can give us knowledge. If the processes of reasoning that lead us to form inductive generalizations (like “All men are mortal”) are reliable, then according to RT, they can lead us to knowledge. 1

Objectivism atheism: objectivism holds that in order to obtain knowledge, man must use an objective process of thought. The essence of objective thought is, first, integration of perceptual data in accordance with logic and, second, a commitment to acknowledging all of the facts of reality, and only the facts. In other words, the only thoughts to consider when forming knowledge of reality are those logically derived from reality. objectivism as an atheistic thinking upholds ultimate reason, not faith of any kind could be seen as a form of agnosticism. Objectivism atheist asserts proof of disbelief by our level of knowledge such as a certainty of religious rightness only a subjective deduction, probability of rightness is an unreasonable inconclusive induction, probability of wrongness is the most reasonable conclusive induction, certainty of complete wrongness holds more reason but still can be only a subjective deduction. Regardless of what certain religions, scientists, or philosophers believe or say they have to either prove that a thing is certain (i.e. it can never be altered) or they have to accept its probabilistic nature (i.e. there might be a time in the future or unobserved past when the reason does not hold). 1

Ontological atheism: ontological atheism asserts Ontological theism arguments aim too high. Just like logical calculus cannot ascertain a specific basic proposition is correct, existential calculus should not be able to conclude that some specific being exists. Logical calculus can show that if a bachelor exists then a man exists (since a bachelor is, specifically, a man), and existential calculus might be able to show that if certain things exist then god exists. But ontological arguments try to prove that something (god) exists without committing to the existence of any specific thing. They can therefore be roughly divided into several types:- (a) ones that assume that god exists from the get-go, but disguise it in some way; (b) ones that make an error in existential calculus, so are not sound; (c) ones that are correct but trivial, e.g. showing that the sum of all things exists in some sense. rethinks if one agrees that the existence of god has indeed been proven, you still really don’t know much about that god other than that it is infinite and perfect. These characteristics seem to be quite dangerous in light of the characteristics of god that have been posited by many organized religions. They posit someone who cares for us and who would simultaneously damn us to eternity in hell for our failure to believe in him thus we cannot and should not believe in a god. Using rationality, one cannot conceive of a god with infinite perfection, with anthropomorphic qualities (i.e. human motivation, characteristics, or behavior) or an infinite god holding judgments or care about what humans do. Ontological atheism reveals that the Ontological theism argument is problematic on four grounds: A) It defines God as a Necesary being which is necessarily O, and then “derives” that god is a necessary being. This isn’t so much a flaw as it is misleading. B) It assumes that which it seeks to prove, namely it assumes that the Necessary-God is logically possible, which denies the very possibility that god doesn’t exist. Instead of wrestling with the claim that god doesn’t exist and showing it is false, the argument a-priori assumes that it is false. C) It relies on a confusion between epistemic and logical possibility. As a broad proposition the Necessary-God needs to be treated as an epistemic possibility, leading to a weakened 1B which cannot support the rest of the argument. D) Even the weakened 1B should not be accepted. Like all Necessary postulates, that a Necessary-God exists is either true in all possible worlds or not true in all possible worlds. The argument doesn’t advance the position that it is true in all possible worlds. 1

Panatheism atheism:  the assertion that no god or gods exist and that then nothing can be correctly termed holy or be considered sacred. The belief in “all atheism” which holds the position that all people are atheists to at least one or more god models thus belief all god concepts should be rejected and because there is no God, nothing can properly be termed sacred or holy. Panatheism atheism comes to disbelief by the simple absurdity of competing beliefs all saying only there way is true when if one is true all others are false thus all are false because all cannot be true and if you had all them in front of you like flashcards how could one be desired over another anyway? A panatheism atheism belief can be also understood as because there is no right conception of god, nothing can properly be termed sacred or holy. panatheism atheists believe “all are atheist” or the position that all people where they acknowledge it or not are atheists to at least one or more god myths or beliefs held by someone or even your belief in only one concept is to be atheist to another. It is not an atheist term of a pantheistic outlook (minus the theism). Pronounced ‘pan-atheism’, this word attempts to overcome the seeming incompatibility of ‘pantheism’ and ‘atheism.’ pan-atheism can be seen as rejecting Spinoza asserted that for a concept of god to make any sense at all, it must simply be nature, (god is nature = pantheism). That is, Spinoza pantheism asserts god cannot be something outside nature that controls it, but must necessarily be part of it. Indeed, if all Being is God, that is, if Nature is God, then simultaneously, this implies that God does not exist as a transcendent entity, especially not one with a face or personal identity. If Nature ‘is’ God, then God ‘is’ dead: a new an beautiful ‘syllogism.’ God here invokes Nietzsche’s observation of God’s death as the ‘end’ of transcendence or the subordination of transcendence to immanence. Indeed, those who posit a plane of univocal immanence are panatheists. And if panatheism is Nietzschean/Spinozistic ontology, then transcendental empiricism is its epistemology. 1

Philosophical atheism:  uses philosophy to justify non-belief. Philosophical atheists have not shared a common set of atheism no god or gods exist views, philosophical convictions can often set them off from other groups of atheism thinkers. There are different kinds of philosophical atheists as well as  many philosophical justifications for atheism. Many atheists feel that the idea of God as presented by the major religions is essentially self-contradictory, and that it is logically impossible that such a God could exist. Others are atheists through skepticism, because they see no evidence that God exists. Of course, some people are atheists without having any particular logical argument to back up their atheism. For some, it is simply the most comfortable, common sense position to take. Philosophical atheism is different addressing one of agnosticisms biggest objections the limit to knowledge God exists or agnosticisms believed impossibility to prove the nonexistence of something. There are many counterexamples to prove the nonexistence of something. For example, it is quite simple to prove that there does not exist a prime number larger than all other prime numbers. Of course, this deals with well-defined objects obeying well-defined rules. Whether Gods or universes are similarly well-defined is a matter for debate. However, assuming for the moment that the existence of a God is not provably impossible, there are still subtle reasons for assuming the nonexistence of God. If we assume that something does not exist, it is always possible to show that this assumption is invalid by finding a single counterexample. If on the other hand we assume that something does exist, and if the thing in question is not provably impossible, showing that the assumption is invalid may require an exhaustive search of all possible places where such a thing might be found, to show that it isn’t there. Such an exhaustive search is often impractical or impossible. There is no such problem with largest primes, because we can prove that they don’t exist. Therefore it is generally accepted that we must assume things do not exist unless we have evidence that they do. To assume that God exists is to make an assumption which probably cannot be tested. We cannot make an exhaustive search of everywhere God might be to prove that he doesn’t exist anywhere. If God interacts with our universe in any way, the effects of his interaction must have some physical manifestation. Hence his interaction with our universe must be in principle detectable. If God is essentially nondetectable, it must therefore be the case that he does not interact with our universe in any way. Many atheists would argue that if God does not interact with our universe at all, it is of no importance whether he exists or not. A thing which cannot even be detected in principle does not logically exist. Things do not exist merely because they have been defined to do so. We know a lot about the definition of Santa Claus–what he looks like, what he does, where he lives, what his reindeer are called, and so on. But that still doesn’t mean that Santa exists. 1

Political or State atheism: is the official promotion of atheism by a government, sometimes combined with active suppression of religious freedom and practice. In contrast, a secular state purports to be officially neutral in matters of religion, supporting neither religion nor irreligion. Political or state atheism may refer to a government’s anti-clericalism or antireligion, which opposes religious institutional power and influence in all aspects of public and political life, including the involvement of religion in the everyday life of the citizen. State promotion of atheism can be to remove all opposition to the governments power not always a true disbelief only of reason. Political or state atheism as a public norm was first practiced during a brief period in Revolutionary France. Since then, such a policy was repeated only in Revolutionary Mexico and some communist states. The Soviet Union had a long history of state atheism. 1

Polyatheist atheism: the act of having many gods you do not believe in. A term used by atheists to point out the fact that basically everyone on earth is an atheist to some extent. Nobody on Earth believes in every god, therefore everyone is an atheist. Such as one saying I am a Christian thus without saying it is an atheist to many or all other gods, one saying I am a Muslim without saying it is an atheist to many or all other gods, or Such as one saying I am a Buddhist without saying it is an atheist to many or all other gods. Therefore an Atheist who is using Polyatheist atheism would say see I don’t believe in any of those gods including yours, therefore I am a polyatheist. 1

Practical atheism: mostly consist with an intuitive system, so intuition to such an atheist is a really practical type of knowing. Practical atheism uses mental shortcuts and gut feelings. This type of thinking uses a kind of “atheistic common sense” to justify their non-belief in gods. Usually there would be a use of the old reliable saying “seeing is believing” or they have never proved themselves to me to justify a practical atheism non-belief in gods or anything supernatural. In practicalistic atheism, individuals live as if there are no gods and explain natural phenomena without resorting to the divine. Practical atheism develops conscious thoughts and common sense counter beliefs to challenge seeing the need to believe.  Some of practical atheist’s using such personal common sense disbeliefs could be seen as accurate and useful, where as some could be inaccurate and limiting in actual application to convince to others understanding of such a personal relative atheistic common sense.  Moreover, the existence of gods may not always be completely denied just inferred, designated unnecessary to prove or disprove or useless to their lives; gods neither provide purpose to life nor influence everyday life anyways they see. A practical atheist could state, I am me, I am hear in reality therefore I exist; gods’ that are claimed to exist are not about me nor exist in my reality. Gods’ existing is about existence of lives that are placed outside reality. So the gods proposed are limited because they cannot be shown in reality and I am not limited because I can be shown in reality. Seeing gods in reality would allow belief but since nonreality cannot be seen outside reality, I am thus an atheist because my intuition lives in reality where gods do not exist. 1

Psychological atheism: how do psychologists who believe in God and follow a religious tradition reconcile their beliefs with adherence to the science of psychology? In Adieu to God: Why Psychology Leads to Atheism, Mick Power argues that science has all the answers. Psychological atheists are those atheists that say god is only a human invention. Research shows that Psychologists are the least religious amongst professors in America. Sigmund Freud famously argued that God and other religious beliefs are human inventions, created to fulfill various psychological and emotional wants or needs. Psychological atheism also addresses psychological, sociological and economical arguments: Some thinkers, including the anthropologist Ludwig Feuerbach like Sigmund Freud argued that God and other religious beliefs are human inventions, created to fulfill various psychological and emotional wants or needs. Marxists like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and the Russian anarchist and revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin have argued that belief in God and religion are social functions, used by those in power to oppress and enslave the working classes. Psychological atheism will differ depending on the psychology approached followed or valued because “psychology” is not some unitary disciple: experimental psychologists are scientists; clinical psychologists are not medical doctors; organizational psychologists are not much concerned with religious salvation; social psychologists often sound like sociologists but they are not. 1 2

Reared or Familiar atheism: if you are born with an atheist parents/ family in the US. There is 30% chance your still an “atheist”, 20% chance you became Agnostics or “Unaffiliated.”, or lived in an atheist cultural or region chances are you are also an atheist just like others born into a certain faith or religious doctrine. In other words, about half of the people raised as atheists still didn’t believe in God as they grew up. Atheists don’t Sunday schools or atheist privet schools with atheist curriculum to force kids into. Atheists usually don’t indoctrinate our kids “into atheism” from a young age. Atheists don’t have “traditions” to follow. Atheism isn’t attached to any particular cultural identity. Many atheist parents most likely encourage their children to think for themselves and not believe in something just because their parents believe it. 1

Relative atheism: relative atheism or relative metaphysical atheism maintain an implicit denial of a particular concept of god based on the incongruity between their individual philosophies and attributes commonly applied to god, such as transcendence, a personal aspect, or unity, etc. Examples include pantheism, panentheism, and deism. This is contrasted be the more common absolute atheism or Absolute metaphysical atheists subscribe to some form of Physicalism, which explicitly denies the existence of non-physical beings. 1

Religionist atheism: religionist atheism can mean different things kind of like wanting to keep religion or add religion to one’s atheism even when god has been abandoned. It seems like religiosity or religious beliefs with the belief in god missing. Religionist atheism can range from a godless religion to simply those who speak atheism in the guise of language taken broadly from the religious traditions. These atheists though utilize religious traditions may not believe in a god as a being or creator but highly value religious thinking, goals, practices, ceremonies, and religious morality or religious figures, most notably jesus. Likewise, a religionist atheist could hold a positive disbelief or an unsure lack of belief. Religionist atheism could also entail a gentler, more diplomatic atheism that is somewhat pro-religion or not antireligious; they could have “Religion without God”. Religionist atheism would be very drawn to places like The Unitarian Universalist church or The Sunday Assembly, an “atheist church” this is not to say all who attend The Sunday Assembly are religionist atheists. It is possible religionist atheists may adopt a “religious attitude,” a worldview which “accepts the full, independent reality of value,” as distinct from scientific fact and which holds that both individuals and the natural world they inhabit have intrinsic, transcendental value without believing in a personal god. However, this independent reality of value which could be a kind of moral realism is not saying all moral realists have to be religious, or connected to religionist atheism thinking. Religionist atheists think of themselves as atheist but in the no gods way not much else. Most other atheists have a larger disconnection to most things religious not a religionist atheist they are manly disconnect from belief in a god concept or the supernatural but hold value in the religious teachings even if they are possibly all myths. Most of these atheists may be more like moral realists but some may seem more like moral “anti-realism,” “non-realism,” or “irrealism”. 1

Scientific atheism: uses the scientific method to justify non-belief in gods or the supernatural and scientific atheists may also reject all things not materialistic or evolutionary derived. Scientific atheists often start with the position of philosophical atheism and then, due to their scientific theorizing, concluding that the actions of a “god” have no place in a any scientifically-controlled experiment and are simply myths people created to explain the natural scientific world they in less modern times could not understand. Informed consensus rule is a cornerstone of Atheistic thought. Scientific Atheism works on the principle that the utilisation of credible evidence in personal, political and national decisions be the main guide for societies. The consequences of choices take into account the understanding of a common empathy and compassion. Scientific Atheism analytically examines the failings of systems, which allow preferential treatment to the disadvantage of arbitrarily victimised groups. It acknowledges that the rich tapestry of humanity is not open to the selective interpretation of writings from ignorant times. Pigeonholing scientific Atheism into a decidedly unacceptable category reeks of irresponsible promotion. It misrepresents a positive response to the dire circumstances afflicting a world in turmoil. Scientific Atheism places Homo sapiens in proper perspective in the Universe, away from unevidenced, dangerous and improbable illusions erroneously manufactured in the superstitious cauldrons of antiquity. Scientific Atheism unequivocally affirms that we are alone in a cosmos devoid of supernatural realms. The existence of such mental notions are invalidated by the total absence of evidence. Consequently, humanity has to deal with the psychological implications of that knowledge effectively if we are to survive. 1

Seeker atheism: you embrace the fact that you may not have all the answers, you may not be sure if others do either or what answers you have need clarification. You’re part of a category, which tends to be among the least critical of religion as most other groups. You come across as non-committal, which hopefully doesn’t bleed over into your personal life as well, but it might, and you may get harassed for being somewhat of an intellectual coward from other atheists.  Nonetheless, you embrace your uncertainty. 1

Skeptical atheism: takes on fundamental religious claims directly, claiming religious tradition need skeptical investigations and without external proof the only thinking is atheism. Skeptical atheism feels skepticism towards the paranormal claims, astrology and psychic healers should go hand in hand with skepticism towards the claim that gods exist, religious and holy claims are true are often treated separately but skeptical atheism asserts that they should not be because both criticisms generally stem from a common commitment to a naturalistic and materialistic view of the universe rejecting the paranormal, supernatural, and magical thinking. This atheism arises in the context of total evidence skepticism and so (given my particular way of developing that skepticism) with an awareness of human immaturity in scientific time. The seeming paradoxicality of this idea is erased when we notice that total evidence skepticism may be accepted for the purposes of deeper inquiry and so along with the aim to make what progress we can, even at our relatively primitive stage of development, by reference to (among other things) what seems to us most obviously true. The Skeptical atheist will think their own position may represent such progress. Nevertheless, skepticism still marks the larger context in which they operate. 1

Spiritual atheism: spirituality seems to be one of those words which have as many definitions as it does people trying to define it. Spiritual atheists can come to disbelief from the outrageous thinking that god is not spiritual but there is spirituality thus we must remove an unnecessary god. Spiritual atheists see a godless Spirituality possibly involving a variety of very personal things like self-realization, philosophical searching, etc. For many others, it is something like a very deep and strong emotional reaction to “life wonders” stars showing the vastness of the universe on a clear night, seeing a gleam in the eyes of a newborn life, etc. For many atheists even ones that don’t claim spirituality in their atheism may have reached that result buy a kind of life quest philosophical searching and religious questioning. Thus, one might argue that their atheism is an integral component of their “spirituality” and their ongoing search for meaning in life.  Spiritual atheism could involve exploring the realms of meditation, yoga, etc. in a godless way far removed from the religiously they originated anciently. 1

Theodicean atheism:  theodicean atheists believe that the world as they experience it cannot be reconciled with the qualities commonly ascribed to god and gods by theologians. Theodicean atheism is a specific branch of theology and philosophy that exposes the irreconcilable existence of evil or suffering in the world with the assumption of a benevolent god or the problem of evil. An attempt show there can be no co-existence of an “all good” creator god thus the irresponsible creation of “all bad” evil meaning one is true the other cannot be true. 1 2

Theological noncognitivism atheism:  theological noncognitivism atheists – holds that the statement “god exists” does not express a proposition, but is nonsensical or cognitively meaningless. A theological noncognitivist atheist claims “god” does not refer to anything that exists, “god” does not refer to anything that does not exist, “god” does not refer to something that may or may not exist, and “god” has no literal significance, just as “Fod” has no literal significance. The term God was chosen for this example, obviously any theological term [such as “Yahweh” and “Allah”] that is not falsifiable is subject to scrutiny. Many people who label themselves “theological noncognitivists” claim that all alleged definitions for the term “God” are circular, for instance, “God is that which caused everything but God”, defines “God” in terms of “God”. They also claim that in Anselm’s definition “God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived”, that the pronoun “which” refers back to “God” rendering it circular as well. Others who label themselves “theological noncognitivists” argue in different ways, depending on what one considers the “theory of meaning” to be. Michael Martin, writing from a verificationist perspective, concludes that religious language is meaningless because it is not verifiable. 1

I am not sure we can get all people to agree on any of this which is not my point anyway it is to inform and offer new possible ideas concerning disbelief but just like the exact diffusion of a god concept existence some stuff will hold a never ending problem. Therefore in trying to define or analyze atheism styles in this way I have some aspects may hold possible challenge, similar to those connected to theism and god concepts which should make most atheists somewhat Ignostic.

By Damien Marie AtHope

Theists and Atheists as well as Agnostics?

Yes, I Reject All god Claims
 
I am a rationalist not a skeptic so I have no problem saying I am against claims of a deistic god too, as I reject all god claims as unjustified claims with nothing but magical thinking confusions or delusions and I know their is not any warrant to even start as no one knows anything that is god anything but superstition this what is offered as a nothing can be rejected as nothing. If anyone thinks different give me a valid and reliable ontology of the term god and I will then address it bit no one can as its created out of nothing bit an argument from ignorance to begin with which I reject fully until shown some sound reason to start thinking otherwise. The term god is accepted as if its some kind of presupposition status which it does not at all.
“If you could stop someone from rapping a child, would you? if you answer yes, you’re more moral than your god.”
 
“Damien, this post (about stopping someone from rapping a child) is ignorant. It assumes that every person who reads this a believer and then attempts to offend them. Why not focus your anger on the REAL enemy like the Rapist, Not God or believers…” – Challenger
 
My response, “I will express my disbelief with disregard to any belief but do try not to attack people personally just based on their belief but will on their behavior. This meme is saying almost all people are more moral that the claimed moral gods they seem to think are more moral then them if that offends them good if true that there was a god they should be offended at such a moral monster god and if they are not offended at an uncaring immoral god than I am both offended by them and their god.”
 
“Damien, It just makes too many ass*umptions, which as you know: Make us ALL sound like an A$$…” – Challenger
 
My response, “no it presents a logical question to a moral god believer showing moral gods don’t exist or they would at least have the morality of humans and as this is not seen then at least we can know humans must be more moral than gods.”

1. COSMOLOGICAL DISPROOFS

2. TELEOLOGICAL DISPROOFS

3. EVIDENTIAL EVIL DISPROOFS

4. NONBELIEF DISPROOFS  

  

============================

1. COSMOLOGICAL DISPROOFS

Disproof from the contingency of the universe 

Nicholas Everitt,

“The Argument from Imperfection: A New Proof of the Nonexistence of God,”
Philo 9, no. 2 (2006): 113-30
www.pdcnet.org/collection/show?id=philo_2006_0009_0002_0113_0130&file_type=pdf

Disproof from relativistic cosmology

Quentin Smith,
“Atheism, Theism, and Big Bang Cosmology,”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1991): 48-65
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbabillity of God (2006), pp. 41-60
www.infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/cosmology.html

Quentin Smith,
“A Defense of the Cosmological Argument for God’s Nonexistence,”
W.L.Craig &Q.Smith(eds.),Theism, Atheism,& BigBang Cosmology (1993), pp.232-55
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 61-81
www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.001.0001/acprof-9780198263838-chapter-9

Disproofs from quantum cosmology

Quentin Smith,
“Stephen Hawking’s Cosmology and Theism,”
Analysis 54 (1994): 236-43
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 86-93
www.infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/hawking.html

Quentin Smith,
“Why Stephen Hawking’s Cosmology Precludes a Creator,”
Philo 1, no. 1 (1998): 75-93
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 94-106
www.pdcnet.org/philo/content/philo_1998_0001_0001_0075_0093

Victor J. Stenger,
“A Scenario for a Natural Origin of our Universe,”
a slightly shorter version of Philo 9, no. 2 (2006): 93-102
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0710/0710.3137.pdf

Lawrence M. Krauss,
A Universe from Nothing: Why There is Something rather than Nothing (2012)
www.scribd.com/doc/123879510

Disproofs from the laws of physics

Victor J. Stenger,
“The Laws of the Void,”
Has Science Found God? (2003), pp. 187-218

Victor J. Stenger,
The Comprehensible Cosmos: Where Do the Laws of Physics Come From? (2006)
www.scribd.com/doc/90584308

Victor J. Stenger,
“Cosmic Evidence,”
God: The Failed Hypothesis (2007), pp. 113-36

2. TELEOLOGICAL DISPROOFS

Anthropic disproofs

Nicholas Everitt,

“Arguments from Scale,”
The Nonexistence of God (2004), pp. 213-26
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 111-24

Victor J. Stenger,
“The Anthropic Coincidences: A Natural Explanation,”
The Skeptical Intelligencer 3, no. 3 (1999): 2-17
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 125-49
www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/stenger_intel.html

Michael Ikeda and Bill Jefferys,
“The Anthropic Principle Does Not Support Supernaturalism,”
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 150-66
http://quasar.as.utexas.edu/anthropic.html

Design disproofs

Wesley C. Salmon,
“Religion and Science: A New Look at Hume’s Dialogues,”
Philosophical Studies 33 (1978): 143-76,
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 167-93
www.jstor.org/stable/4319203

Michael Martin,

“Atheistic Teleological Arguments,”
Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990), pp. 317-33
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp.198-214

Richard Dawkins,
“The Improbability of God,”
Free Inquiry 18, no. 3 (1998): 6-9
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God, pp. 223-29
https://richarddawkins.net/2014/06/the-improbability-of-god

Bruce and Francis Martin,
“Neither Intelligent nor Designed,”
Skeptical Inquirer 27, no. 6 (2003): 45-49
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 215-22
www.csicop.org/si/show/neither_intelligent_nor_designed
Raymond D. Bradley,
“God, Design, and Evolution: A Teleological Argument for Atheism” (2003)
www.sfu.ca/content/dam/sfu/philosophy/docs/bradley/design_by_god.pdf

Jerry A. Coyne,
“Does Evolution Improve Theology?” (2010)
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2010/05/09/does-evolution-improve-theology

Abby Hafer,
“Animals that Shouldn’t Exist, According to Intelligent Design” (2012)
http://uubedford.org/spirituality/sermons/900-qanimals-that-shouldnt-exist-according-to-intelligent-designq.html

Disembodied mind disproofs

Steven J. Conifer,
“Mind-Brain Dependence as Twofold Support for Atheism” (2001)

www.infidels.org/library/modern/steven_conifer/mbd.html

Jeffrey Jay Lowder,
“The Evidential Argument from Physical Minds” (2012)
www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2012/06/the-evidential-argument-from-physical-minds.apm

3. EVIDENTIAL EVIL DISPROOFS

Evidential natural evil disproofs

Eric Russert Kraemer,
“Darwin’s Doubts and the Problems of Animal Pain,”
Between the Species 3 (August 2003)
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=bts

Quentin Smith,
“An Atheological Argument from Evil Natural Laws,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (1991): 159-74
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 235-49
www.infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/evil_laws.html

Robert Francescotti,
“The Problem of Animal Pain and Suffering,”
J.McBrayer & D.Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (2013), pp. 113-27
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118608005.ch8/summary

William L. Rowe,

“The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,”
American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 335-41
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 250-61
http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~ekremer/resources/William%20Rowe.pdf

William L. Rowe,

“Evil and Theodicy,”
Philosophical Topics 16 (2) (1988):119-32
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 262-74
www.pdcnet.org/collection/show?id=philtopics_1988_0016_0002_0119_0132&file_type=pdf

William L. Rowe,

“The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look,”
D. Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil (1996), pp. 262-85
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 275-301

William L. Rowe,

“Reply to Plantinga,”
Nous 32 (1998): 545-52
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 302-10
www.jstor.org/stable/2671875

Robert Bass,
“Many Inscrutable Evils,”
Ars Disputandi 11 (2011): 118-32
www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15665399.2011.10820061

Robert Bass,
“Inscrutable Evils: Still Numerous, Still Relevant,”
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 75 (2014): 379-84
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21692327.2015.1008024#abstract

Andrea M. Weisberger,
“The Pollution Solution: A Critique of Dore’s Response to the Argument from Evil,”
Sophia 36 (1997): 53-74
http://infidels.org/library/modern/andrea_weisberger/pollution.html

Andrea M. Weisberger,
“The Non-Concessionary Solutions: Natural Evil” and “The Final Solution,”
Suffering Belief (1999), pp. 101-24, 209-32

Nathan Nobis,
“The Real Problem of Infant and Animal Suffering,”
Philo 5, no. 2 (2002): 216-25
www.morehouse.edu/facstaff/nnobis/papers/newchigreply.htm

G. S. Paul,
“Theodicy’s Problem: A Statistical Look at the Holocaust of the Children and the Implications of Natural Evil for the Free Will and Best of All Possible Worlds Hypotheses,”
Philosophy & Theology 19 (2007): 125–49
http://gregspaul.webs.com/Philosophy&Theology.pdf

Paul Draper,
“God and Evil: A Philosophical Inquiry” (2011)
http://philreligion.nd.edu/assets/44795

David Kyle Johnson,
“Natural Evil and the Simulation Hypothesis,”
Philo 14, no. 2 (2011): 161-75
www.simulation-argument.com/johnson.pdf

David Kyle Johnson,
“The Failure of Plantinga’s Solution to the Logical Problem of Natural Evil,”
Philo 15, no. 2 (2012): 145-57
http://staff.kings.edu/davidjohnson/The%20Failure%20of%20Plantinga’s%20solution%20to%20the%20Logical%20Problem%20of%20Natural%20Evi%20v1.6.1%20(Corrections%20applied).pdf

Moti Mizrahi,
“The Problem of Natural Inequality: A New Problem of Evil,”
Philosophia 42 (2014): 127-36
http://philpapers.org/archive/MIZTPO

Robert Bass,
“Modal Evil and Divine Necessity” (2015)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9Z66YKTauRBQnp4dl80OExMSUk/view?pli=1

Evidential moral evil disproofs

Andrea M. Weisberger,
“Depravity, Divine Responsibility and Moral Evil: A Critique of a New Free Will Defence,”
Religious Studies 31 (1995): 375-90
http://infidels.org/library/modern/andrea_weisberger/depravity.html

Andrea M. Weisberger,
“Moral Evil and Soulmaking,”
Suffering Belief (1999), pp. 125-62, 163-207

 

Joel Thomas Tierno,

“On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom,”
Sophia 40, no. 2 (2001): 1-6
www.springerlink.com/content/q543806847753h25

Joel Thomas Tierno,

“On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom: Response to Nagasawa and Trakakis,”
Sophia 43, no. 1 (2004): 115-26
www.springerlink.com/content/x3n28876w67830h3

Joel Thomas Tierno,

“On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom: A Response to Trakakis’ Second Critique,”
Sophia 45, no. 2 (2006): 131-38
www.springerlink.com/content/350868xj87811134

Joel Thomas Tierno,

“On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom: A Response to Trakakis’ Third Critique,”
Sophia 47, no. 2 (2008): 223-30
www.springerlink.com/content/qu5802310q060q40

Evidential epistemic evil disproofs

Robert J. Howell,
“The Theist’s Defeater: The Problem of Epistemic Evil”
www.rjhjr.com/philosophy/files/The%20Theist’s%20Defeater1.pdf

Joel Thomas Tierno,

Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil (2007)

4. NONBELIEF DISPROOFS

Disproofs from widespread nonbelief

Theodore M. Drange,
“The Argument from Nonbelief,”
Religious Studies 29 (1993): 417-32
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 341-56
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Drange-The-Argument-from-Non-Belief.pdf

Theodore M. Drange,
Nonbelief and Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God (1998)

Theodore M. Drange,
“McHugh’s Expectations Dashed,”
Philo 5 (2002): 242-48
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 357-61
www.pdcnet.org/collection/show?id=philo_2002_0005_0002_0242_0248&file_type=pdf

Victor Cosculluela,
“Bolstering the Argument from Nonbelief,”
Religious Studies 32 (1996): 507-12
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 362-68
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1581164

Stephen Maitzen,
“Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism,”
Religious Studies 42 (2006): 177-91
http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_files/sites/philosophy/resources/documents/Maitzen_Hiddenness.pdf

Theodore M. Drange,
“The Arguments from Confusion and Biblical Defects,”
M. Martin & R. Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 369-79
www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/confusion.html

Disproofs from reasonable nonbelief

J. L. Schellenberg,

Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993)

J. L. Schellenberg,
“An Argument for Atheism from the Reasonableness of Nonbelief,”
M. Martin & R. Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 390-404

J. L. Schellenberg,

“Response to Howard-Snyder,”
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1996): 455-62
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp.405-12
www.jstor.org/pss/40231958

J. L. Schellenberg,

“Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism,”
M.L.Peterson & R.J.VanArragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (2004), pp. 30-41
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp.413-26

Philip Kuchar,
“God, Atheism and Incompatibility: The Argument from Nonbelief” (2001)
www.infidels.org/library/modern/philip_kuchar/anb.html

Robert P. Lovering,
“Divine Hiddenness and Inculpable Ignorance,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2004): 89-107
www.academia.edu/8152109/Divine_Hiddenness_and_Inculpable_Ignorance

J. L. Schellenberg,

“The Hiddennes Argument Revisited (I),”
Religious Studies 41 (2005): 201-25
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Schellenberg-The-hiddenness-argument-revisited-I.pdf

J. L Schellenberg,
“The Hiddenness Argument Revisited (II),”
Religious Studies 41 (2005): 287-303
www.jstor.org/stable/20008599

J. L. Schellenberg,

“What Divine Hiddenness Reveals, or How Weak Theistic Evidence is Strong Atheistic Proof” (2008)
www.infidels.org/library/modern/john_schellenberg/hidden.html

J. L. Schellenberg,

“The Sounds of Silence Stilled: A Reply to Jordan on Hiddenness” (2008)
www.infidels.org/library/modern/john_schellenberg/silence-stilled.html

J. L. Schellenberg,

“The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil,”
Faith and Philosophy 27 (2010): 45-60
http://philpapers.org/archive/SCHTHP-5.pdf

J. L. Schellenberg,

“Divine Hiddenness,”
P.Draper &C.Talliaferro (eds.), A Companion toPhilosophy ofReligion(2010), pp.509-18
http://philpapers.org/archive/SCHDH.1.pdf

1. SINGLE ATTRIBUTE DISPROOFS

2. MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES DISPROOFS

3. LOGICAL EVIL DISPROOFS

4. DOCTRINAL DISPROOFS

 

================================
1. SINGLE ATTRIBUTE DISPROOFS

Creator and designer disproofs

Quentin Smith,
“Causation and the Logical Impossibility of a Divine Cause,”
Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 169-91
www.infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/causation.html

Gilbert Fulmer,
“The Concept of the Supernatural,”
Analysis 37 (1976/77): 113-16
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 326-29
www.jstor.org/stable/3327510

Gilbert Fulmer,
“A Fatal Logical Flaw in Anthropic Principle Design Arguments,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (2001): 101-110
www.jstor.org/pss/40018863

Richard D. Kortum,
“The Very Idea of Design: What God Couldn’t Do,”
Religious Studies 40 (2004): 81-96
www.jstor.org/pss/20008511

Omnibenevolence disproofs

Theodore Guleserian,
“Can Moral Perfection Be an Essential Attribute,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1985): 219-41
www.jstor.org/pss/2107354

Earl Conee,
“The Nature and the Impossibility of Moral Perfection,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1994): 815-25
www.jstor.org/pss/2108412

J. Gregory Keller,
“On Perfect Goodness,”
Sophia 49 (2010): 29-36
https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/3207/On_Perfect_Goodness.pdf

Omnipotence disproofs

J. L. Cowan,
“The Paradox of Omnipotence,”
Analysis 25 (1965/supplement): 102-108
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 330-36
www.jstor.org/stable/3326724

J. L. Cowan,
“The Paradox of Omnipotence Revisited,”
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1974): 435-45
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 337-48
www.jstor.org/stable/40230457

Douglas Walton,
“The Omnipotence Paradox,”
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1975), pp. 705-15
www.jstor.org/pss/40230546

Douglas Walton,
“Some Theorems of Fitch on Omnipotence,”
Sophia 15, no. 1 (1976): 20-27
Reprinted in L. Urban & D. Walton (eds.), The Power of God: Readings on Omnipotence and Evil (1978), pp. 182-91
www.springerlink.com/content/3637585t0p637335

Loren Meierding,
“The Impossibility of Necessary Omnitemporal Omnipotence,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (1980): 21-26
www.jstor.org/pss/40012525

Tzachi Zamir,
“The Omnipotence Paradox as a Problem of Infinite Regress,”
Sophia 38, no. 1 (1999): 1-14
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02806407

Sarah Adams,
“A New Paradox of Omnipotence.”
Philosophia 43 (2015): 759-85
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11406-015-9601-y

Omniscience disproofs

Limit of the known disproof

Roland Puccetti,
“Is Omniscience Possible?”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1963): 92-93
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 379-80
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048406312341561

Indexicals disproof

Patrick Grim,
“Against Omniscience: The Case from Essential Indexicals,”
Nous 19 (1985): 151-80
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 350-52
www.jstor.org/stable/2214928

Patrick Grim,
“The Being That Knew Too Much,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000): 141-54 (esp. 141-44)
Reprinted in M. Martin & R. Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 408-21 (esp. 409-12)
www.pgrim.org/pgrim/Being.pdf (esp. pp. 2-6)

Patrick Grim,
“Problems with Omniscience,”
in J. P. Moreland et al. (eds.), Debating Christian Theism (2013)
www.pgrim.org/articles/omniscience9.pdf

Disproofs from expressive incompleteness and internal incompleteness

Patrick Grim,
“Logic and Limits of Knowledge and Truth,”
Nous 22 (1988): 341-67 (expressive esp. 347-51, 354-56; internal esp. 351-56)
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 381-407 (expressive esp. 387-90, 393-95; internal esp. 390-95)
www.jstor.org/stable/2215708

Set of all truths disproof

Patrick Grim,
“Logic and Limits of Knowledge & Truth,”
Nous 22 (1988): 341-67 (esp. 356-59)
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 381-407 (esp. 395-98)
www.jstor.org/stable/2215708

Patrick Grim,
“The Being that Knew Too Much,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000): 141-54 (esp. 147-52)
Reprinted in M. Martin & R. Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 408-21 (esp. 414-19)
www.pgrim.org/pgrim/Being.pdf (esp. pp. 10-19)

Patrick Grim,
“Problems with Omniscience,”
in J. P. Moreland et al. (eds.), Debating Christian Theism (2013)
www.pgrim.org/articles/omniscience9.pdf

Undefinability of truth disproof

Colin Howson,
“The Liar,”
Objecting to God (2011), pp. 200-205

Disproofs from propositional vs experiential knowledge

John Lachs,
“Professor Prior on Omniscience,”
Philosophy 38 (1963): 361-64
www.jstor.org/stable/3748601

Ryan Stringer,
“Omniscience and Learning” (2010)
www.infidels.org/library/modern/ryan_stringer/learning.html

Rob Lovering,

“Does God Know What It’s Like Not to Know?”
Religious Studies 49 (2013): 85-99
www.academia.edu/8152325/Does_God_Know_What_Its_Like_Not_to_Know

Collections of single attribute disproofs

Patrick Grim,
“Impossibility Arguments,”
in M. Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (2007), Chapter 12
https://worldtracker.org/media/library/Sociology/Philosophy%20-%20The%20Cambridge%20Companion%20Series/The%20Cambridge%20Companion%20to%20Atheism.pdf

Nicholas Everitt,

“The Divine Attributes,”
Philosophy Compass 5, no. 1 (2010): 78-90
www.academia.edu/28931352/The_Divine_Attributes

2. MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES DISPROOFS

Omniscience vs omnipotence disproof

David Blumenfeld,
“On the Compossibility of the Divine Attributes,”
Philosophical Studies 34 (1978): 91-103
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 220-31
www.jstor.org/stable/4319234

Yujin Nagasawa,
“Divine Omniscience and Experience: A Reply to Alter,”
Ars Disputandi (2003)
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/10440/1068/1/Nagasawa_Divine2003.pdf

Omniscience vs omnibenevolence disproofs

Michael Martin,

“A Disproof of the God of the Common Man,”
Question 7 (1974): 115-24
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 232-41

Douglas P. Lackey,
“Divine Omniscience and Human Privacy,”
Philosophy Research Archives 10 (1984): 383-92
http://secure.pdcnet.org/pra/content/pra_1984_10_0_0383_0392

Omnipotence vs omnibenevolence disproofs

Joel Thomas Tierno,

“Omnibenevolence, Omnipotence, and God’s Ability to Do Evil,”
Sophia 36, no. 2 (1997): 1-11
www.springerlink.com/content/8007123045j77136

Wes Morriston,
“Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are They Compatible?”
Religious Studies 37 (2001): 143-60
http://spot.colorado.edu/~morristo/omnipotence-and-necesary-moral-perfection.pdf

Wes Morriston,
“Are Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection Compatible? Reply to Mawson,”
Religious Studies 39 (2003): 441-49
http://spot.colorado.edu/~morristo/wes2mawson.pdf

Creator vs omnibenevolence disproof

Dagfinn Sjaastad Karlsen,
“Is God Our Benefactor? An Argument from Suffering,”
Journal of Philosophy of Life 3, no. 3 (2013): 145-67
www.philosophyoflife.org/jpl201309.pdf

Omniscience vs immutability disproof

Norman Kretzmann,
“Omniscience and Immutability,”
Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966): 409-21
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 198-209
www.ditext.com/kretzmann/omni.html

Agency vs omniscience disproof

Tomis Kapitan,
“Omniscience and Agency,”
Religious Studies 27 (1991): 105-120
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 282-99
www.academia.edu/13052945/Agency_and_Omniscience_-_1991

Tomis Kapitan,
“The Incompatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action: A Reply to David P. Hunt,”
Religious Studies 30 (1994): 55-66
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 300-12
www.academia.edu/13057219/The_Incompatibility_of_Omniscience_and_Intentional_Action_-_1994

Agency vs omni attributes disproof

Matt McCormick,
“The Paradox of Divine Agency,”
in M. Martin & R. Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 313-22
www.csus.edu/indiv/m/mccormickm/DivineAgency.htm

Agency vs disembodiedness disproofs

Adel Daher,
“The Coherence of God-Talk,”
Religious Studies 12 (1976): 445-65
www.jstor.org/pss/20005372

Kai Nielsen,
“God, Disembodied Existence and Incoherence,”
Sophia 26, no. 3 (1987): 27–52
www.springerlink.com/content/m31x0773t8402247

Consciousness vs disembodiedness disproof

Greg Janzen,
“Consciousness and the Nonexistence of God,”
Journal of Philosophical Research 38 (2013): 1-25
www.academia.edu/23539866/Consciousness_and_the_Nonexistence_of_God

Consciousness vs omnipresence disproof

Matt McCormick,
“Why God Cannot Think: Kant, Omnipresence, and Consciousness,”
Philo 3, no. 1 (2000): 5-19
Reprinted in M. Martin & R. Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 213-22
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/McCormick-Why-God-Cannot-Think.pdf

Collections of multiple attributes disproofs

Michael Martin,

“Divine Attributes and Incoherence,”
Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990), pp. 286-316

Michael Martin,

“Omniscience and Incoherence,”
in G.Holmstrom-Hintikka(ed.), Medieval Philosophy and ModernTimes (2000), pp.17-34
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-011-4227-4_2

Michael Martin,

“Theism and Incoherence,”
P.Draper &C.Talliaferro(eds.), A Companion to Philosophy ofReligion(2010), pp.267-73
http://michaelsudduth.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/A-Companion-to-Philosophy-of-Religion.pdf

Theodore M. Drange,
“Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey,”
Philo 1, no. 2 (1998): 49-60
Reprinted in M. Martin & R. Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 185-97
www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/incompatible.html

Moti Mizrahi,
“New Puzzles about Divine Attributes,”
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5, no. 2 (2013)
http://philpapers.org/archive/MIZNPA

3. LOGICAL EVIL DISPROOFS

J. L. Mackie,
“Evil and Omnipotence,”
Mind 64 (1955): 200-12
www.ditext.com/mackie/evil.html

H. J. McCloskey,

“The Problem of Evil,”
Journal of Bible and Religion 30 (1962): 187-97
www.jstor.org/stable/1460031

H. J. McCloskey,

“Evil and the Problem of Evil,”
Sophia 5, no. 1 (1966): 14-19
www.springerlink.com/content/f956ul603448107u

H. J. McCloskey,

God and Evil (1974)
Mark Walker,
“The Anthropic Argument against the Existence of God,”
Sophia 48 (2009): 351-78
http://philos.nmsu.edu/faculty-and-staff/mark-walkers-home-page

Horia Plugaru,
“The Argument from the Existence of Nondeities” (2013)
http://infidels.org/library/modern/horia_plugaru/aend.html

Richard R. La Croix,
“Unjustified Evil and God’s Choice,”
Sophia 13, no. 1 (1974): 20-8
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 116-24
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/la-Croix-Unjustified-Evil-and-Gods-Choice.pdf

Hugh LaFollette,
“Plantinga on the Free Will Defense,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 22 (1980): 123-32
www.hughlafollette.com/papers/Plantinga_on_the_Free_Will_Defense.pdf

J. L. Mackie,
“The Problem of Evil,”
The Miracle of Theism (1982), pp. 150-76
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 73-96
www.questia.com/library/2987311/the-miracle-of-theism-arguments-for-and-against-the

Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky,
“Plantinga and the Problem of Evil,”
The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 8 (2006): 109-13
www.public.iastate.edu/~geirsson/pdf/Plantinga%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Evil,%20World%20Congress.pdf

Gabriel Horner,
“Impaled by the Two Horns of Logic: Omnipotence and Free Will,”
Quodlibet 2, no. 4 (2000)
www.quodlibet.net/articles/horner-logic.shtml

Quentin Smith,
“A Sound Logical Argument from Evil,”
Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy of Language (1997), pp. 148-56
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 106-15
www.apologeticsinthechurch.com/uploads/7/4/5/6/7456646/smith-a-sound-logical-argument-from-evil.pdf

Andrea M. Weisberger,
“The Logical Formulation,”
Suffering Belief (1999), pp. 29-44

Jordan Howard Sobel,
“The Logical Problem of Evil,”
Logic and Theism (2004), pp. 436-95
http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9780511497988

Raymond D. Bradley,

“The Free Will Defense Refuted and God’s Existence Disproved” (2007)
http://infidels.org/library/modern/raymond_bradley/fwd-refuted.html

Dagfinn Sjaastad Karlsen,
“Is God Our Benefactor? An Argument from Suffering,”
Journal of Philosphy of Life 3, no. 3 (2013): 145-67
www.philosophyoflife.org/jpl201309.pdf

J. L. Schellenberg,

“A New Logical Problem of Evil,”
J.McBrayer & D.Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (2013), pp. 34-48
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118608005.ch3/summary

Anders Kraal,
“Has Plantinga ‘buried’ Mackie’s Logical Argument from Evil?”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75, no. 3 (2014): 189-96
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-014-9448-3

Sean Meslar,
“Transworld Depravity and Divine Omniscience,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77, no. 3 (2015): 205-18
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11153-014-9499-5

4. DOCTRINAL DISPROOFS

Disproofs from free will 

Nelson Pike,
“Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,”
The Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 27-46
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Pike-Divine-Omniscience-and-Voluntary-Action.pdf

Nelson Pike,
“A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge Problem,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33, no. 3 (1993): 129-64
www.jstor.org/stable/40026162

Jason Wyckoff,
“On the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom,”
Sophia 49 (2010): 333-41
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11841-010-0168-6

J. L. Schellenberg,

“The Atheist’s Free Will Offence,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56, no. 1 (2004): 1-15
http://ifac.univ-nantes.fr/IMG/pdf/Schellenberg-The_Free_will_offense.pdf

J. L. Schellenberg,

“God, Free Will, and Time: The Free Will Offense Part II,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73, no. 3 (2013): 165-74
http://philpapers.org/archive/SCHGFW.pdf

Disproofs from heaven and hell

Michael Martin,

“Problems with Heaven” (1997)
www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/heaven.html

Michael Martin,

“More on Heaven” (2004)
www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/more.html

William Ferraiola,
“The Heaven Problem,”
Southwest Philosophy Review 16, no. 1 (2000): 75-81
www.academia.edu/174711/The_Heaven_Problem

Yujin Nagasawa, Graham Oppy, and Nick Trakakis,
“Salvation in Heaven?”
Philosophical Papers 33 (2004): 97-119
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/05568640409485137

Jeff Jordan,
“The Problem of Divine Exclusivity,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (1993): 89-101
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01314333

Richard Schoenig,
“The Argument from Unfairness,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 45 (1999): 115-28
www.jstor.org/pss/40036028

Theodore Sider,
“Hell and Vagueness,”
Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002): 58-68
http://tedsider.org/papers/hell.pdf

Gina M. Sully,
“Ominbenevolence and Eternal Damnation,”
Sophia 44, no. 2 (2005): 7-22
www.springerlink.com/content/94427w7562133353

S. Kershnar,
“The Injustice of Hell,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 58 (2005): 103-23
www.jstor.org/stable/40018391

Disproofs from prayer

David Basinger,
“Why Petition an Omnipotent, Omniscient, Wholly Good God?”
Religious Studies 19 (1983): 25-41
www.jstor.org/pss/20005916

David Basinger,
“Petitionary Prayer: A Response to Murray and Meyers,”
Religious Studies 31 (1995): 475-84
www.jstor.org/pss/20019775

Richard Schoenig,
“The Logical Status of Prayer,”
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (1997): 105-18
www.academia.edu/7232846/The_Logical_Status_of_Prayer

Michael Veber,
“Why Even a Believer Should Not Believe That God Answers Prayers,”
Sophia 46, no. 2 (2007): 177-87
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11841-007-0021-8

Disproofs from miracles

George D. Chryssides,
“Miracles and Agents,”
Religious Studies 11 (1975): 319-27
www.jstor.org/pss/20005257

James A. Keller,
“A Moral Argument Against Miracles,”
Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995): 54-78
www.pdcnet.org/collection/show?id=faithphil_1995_0012_0001_0054_0078&file_type=pdf

Christine Overall,
“Miracles as Evidence Against the Existence of God,”
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (1985): 347-53
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 147-53
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1985.tb00404.x/abstract

Christine Overall,
“Miracles and God: A Reply to Robert A. H. Larmer,”
Dialogue 36 (1997): 741-52
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 154-66
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7168280

Christine Overall,
“Miracles and Larmer,”
Dialogue 42 (2003): 123-35
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7141800

Christine Overall,
“Miracles, Evidence, Evil, and God: A Twenty-Year Debate,”
Dialogue 45 (2006): 355-66
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5452644

Disproofs from revelation

Richard R. La Croix,
“The Paradox of Eden,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 15 (1984): 171
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 127-28
www.springerlink.com/content/r757128201214921

Niclas Berggren,
“The Errancy of Fundamentalism Disproves the God of the Bible” (1996)
www.infidels.org/library/modern/niclas_berggren/funda.html

Raymond D. Bradley,

“A Moral Argument for Atheism,”
The New Zealand Rationalist & Humanist (spring 2000): 2-12
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 129-46
www.infidels.org/library/modern/raymond_bradley/moral.html

John Park,
“The Moral Epistemological Argument for Atheism,”
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (2015): 121-42
www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/contents19.html

1. DEFINITIONAL DISPROOFS

2. FINITE ATTRIBUTES DISPROOFS

3. “BEYOND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING” DISPROOFS

4. META DISPROOFS

  

============================

1. DEFINITIONAL DISPROOFS

J. N. Findlay,
“Can God’s Existence Be Disproved?”
Mind 57 (1948): 176-83
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 19-26
www.ditext.com/findlay/god.html

J. N. Findlay,
“God’s Nonexistence: A Reply to Mr. Rainer and Mr. Hughes,”
Mind 58 (1949): 352-54
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 27-30
www.ditext.com/findlay/god.html

John L. Pollock,
“Proving the Nonexistence of God,”
Inquiry 9 (1966): 193-96
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 31-34
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00201746608601469

Douglas Walton,
“Can an Ancient Argument of Carneades on Cardinal Virtues and Divine Attributes Be Used to Disprove the Existence of God?”
Philo 2, no. 2 (1999): 5-13
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 35-44
www.pdcnet.org/scholarpdf/show?id=philo_1999_0002_0002_0005_0013&pdfname=philo_1999_0002_0002_0005_0013.pdf&file_type=pdf

James Rachels,
“God and Moral Autonomy,”
in Can Ethics Provide Answers? (1997), pp. 109-23
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Impossibility of God (2003), pp. 45-58
www.infidels.org/library/modern/james_rachels/autonomy.html

Scott F. Aikin,
“The Problem of Worship,”
Think 25 (2010): 101-113
www.academia.edu/7062247/The_Problem_of_Worship

Scott F. Aiken and Robert B. Talisse,
“The Problem of Worship” and “Defenses of Worship,”
Reasonable Atheism: A Moral Case for Respectful Disbelief (2011), pp. 147-62

Stephen Maitzen,
“Anselmian Atheism,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 225-39
http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_files/sites/philosophy/resources/documents/Maitzen_Anselmian_Atheism.pdf

Einar Duenger Bohn,
“Anselmian Theism and Indefinitely Extensible Perfection,”
Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2012): 671-83
www.einarduengerbohn.com/edb/Research_files/Anselmian%20Theism%20and%20Indefinitely%20Extensible%20Perfection.pdf

2. FINITE ATTRIBUTES DISPROOFS

H. J. McCloskey,

“Would Any Being Merit Worship?”
Southern Journal of Philosophy 2 (1964): 157-64
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1964.tb01479.x/abstract

Michael Martin,

“A Disproof of the God of the Common Man,”
Question 7 (1974): 115-24
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 232-41

P. J. McGrath,
“Evil and the Existence of a Finite God,”
Analysis 46 (1986): 63-64
http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/46/1/63.extract

P. J. McGrath,
“Children of a Lesser God? A Reply to Burke and Crisp,”
Analysis 47 (1987): 236-38
www.jstor.org/pss/3328799

Michael Martin,

“The Finite God Theodicy,”
Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990), pp. 436-40

Peter Hutcheson,
“Omniscience and the Problem of Evil,”
Sophia 31 (1992): 53-8
http://philpapers.org/archive/HUTOAT.pdf

Andrea M. Weisberger,
“The Worshipworthiness of a Finite God,”
Suffering Belief (1999), pp. 92-95

3. “BEYOND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING” DISPROOFS
(i.e., disproofs from skeptical theism)

Willam L. Rowe,

“Skeptical Theism: A Response to Bergmann,”
Nous 35 (2001): 297-303

Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 311-18
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.00298/abstract

Jeff Jordan,
“Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism?”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 403-17
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00567.x/abstract

Mark Piper,
“Why Theists Cannot Accept Skeptical Theism,”
Sophia 47 (2008): 129-48
www.springerlink.com/content/86868p023830831h

Stephen Maitzen,
“Skeptical Theism and Moral Obligation,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (2009): 93-103
http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_files/sites/philosophy/resources/documents/Maitzen_STMO.pdf

Rob Lovering,

“On What God Would Do,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2009): 87-104
www.academia.edu/8152113/On_What_God_Would_Do

Scott Sehon,
“The Problem of Evil: Skeptical Theism Leads to Moral Paralysis,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2010): 67-80
www.bowdoin.edu/faculty/s/ssehon/pdf/sehon-skeptical-theism.pdf

Erik Wielenberg,
“Sceptical Theism and Divine Lies,”
Religious Studies 46 (2010): 509-23
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=7914575&jid=RES&volumeId=46&issueId=04&aid=7914573&fromPage=cupadmin&pdftype=6316268&repository=authInst

Trent Dougherty,
“Reconsidering the Parent Analogy: Unfinished Business for Skeptical Theists,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2012): 17-25
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-012-9359-0

Stephen Maitzen,
“The Moral Skepticism Objection to Skeptical Theism,”
J.McBrayer & D.Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (2013), pp. 444-57
http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_files/sites/philosophy/resources/documents/Maitzen_MSO.pdf

David Kyle Johnson,
“A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,”
Sophia 52 (2013): 425-45
http://staff.kings.edu/davidjohnson/A%20Refutation%20of%20Skeptical%20Theism%20v2.1%20(Final).pdf

Stephen Law,
“Sceptical Theism and a Lying God: Wielenberg’s Argument Defended and Developed,”
Religious Studies 51 (2015): 91-109
http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2014/03/defence-and-development-of-erik.html

Erik Wielenberg,
“The Parent-Child Analogy and the Limits of Skeptical Theism,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (2015): 301-14
www.academia.edu/19893522/The_parent-child_analogy_and_the_limits_of_skeptical_theism

4. META DISPROOFS

Michael Martin,

“The Justification of Negative Atheism as a Justification of Positive Atheism,”
Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990), pp. 281-84

Michael Martin,

“An Indirect Inductive Argument from Evil,”
Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990), pp. 341-49 and 361
Reprinted in M.Martin & R.Monnier (eds.), The Improbability of God (2006), pp. 319-27

Rob Lovering,

“The Problem of the Theistic Evidentialist Philosophers,”
Philo 13, no. 2 (2010): 185-200
www.secure.pdcnet.org/philo/content/philo_2010_0013_0002_0185_0200
Nicholas Everitt,
“Conclusion,”
The Non-existence of God (2004), pp. 301-06
Michael Martin,
“The Argument from Unanswered Disproofs,”
The Open Society 83, no. 1 (2010): 11-12
www.reason.org.nz/journal/Journal_Autumn_2010.pdf (pp. 11-12)

Don’t close your eyes to the Truth
 
When your beliefs are challenged or discredited, don’t close your eyes to the lies once pushed upon you, in stead open your mind to the truth being laid out before you.
 
Neither a child nor the uninformed has any trouble believing the unbelievable, in fact misinterpretation and misunderstanding is often a common standard for those who can’t think or choose not to think.
 
Any honest thinker will replace falsehoods for truth as belief relinquishment when some previous belief is found wanting or confirmed a untrue it must be let go or replaced if one values the ethics of belief.