My Methodological Skepticism Style

My Methodological Skepticism Style, Part of My Methodological Rationalism “Philosophical skepticism is distinguished from methodological skepticism in that philosophical skepticism is an approach that questions the possibility of certainty in knowledge, whereas methodological skepticism is an approach that subjects all knowledge claims to scrutiny with the goal of sorting out true from false claims.” I am going to give a quick and clear expression of my methodological skepticism style. It is more like critical thinking then just some act of doubt, which can be summed up as pausing when any thought is offered, ether by oneself and/or others. I mainly advocate for fallibilism (realizing that humans tend to error and lack accuracy) instead of the falsification skeptics seem to like; I also may rely on the axiomatic arguments, which rests on accepted precepts. Broadly speaking, Fallibilism (from Medieval Latin: fallibilis, “liable to err”) is the philosophical claim that no belief is free from the possibility to be in error or lacking in accuracy, knowledge does not require anything more than epistemic certainty and I believe that extends to all domains of knowledge. Roughly characterized, a belief is epistemically certain when it has the highest possible epistemic status. Epistemic certainty is the full confidence that the epistemic position offered has warrants often accompanied by psychological certainty, but it need not be. It is possible that a subject may have a belief that enjoys the highest possible epistemic status and yet be unaware that it does. In such a case, the subject may feel less than the full confidence that her epistemic position warrants. Questions should be asked as to how...