Science is a Trustable Methodology whereas Faith is not Trustable at all!

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

One should be inspired by science and appalled by faith which then would lead one to the conclusion of atheism or not believing things on faith and only forming beliefs from the known facts of science. 

If your ideas can’t withstand an educated mind, then likely your ideas are intellectually blind. Faith is not a substance with which to judge the truth or falsehood of a reality claim, faith is not evidence of reality things, it’s a mental attitude. So, bringing up trust, faith (trust to you) when one is asserting a reality thing without evidence is to offer a lie. So, faith or trust can be at 100% and yet 100% wrong. Think there are millions of people of different faiths all believing with the same absurdity of assurance that they and only they are right due to faith. But then you see the trust/faith dilemma you can’t determine who is wrong or right by a proclamation of faith because faith is strong belief without evidence or contrary to evidence it is not a valid test of testing reality or making valid claims about it.

If you are a faitheist, don’t forget that faith lacks epistemic humility and doesn’t see its self as potentially wrong nor can it welcome correction or thoughtful reevaluation as it is commonly a form of trusting what is set to be believed or accepting what is thought needed to believe on a hope it is true. Faith is a thinkers folly as a method of trying to know or confirm what can be known is not a rational nor a sound justification to believe anything as well as faith wrongly inspires undue confidence in what is a proposed belief and thus it is irrational and unwarranted as well as commonly inspires lacking any openness that it could be wrong, like that in the healthy persuasion of fallibilism and neither does it welcome a reasoned ethics of belief nor sound epistemic humility.

“Reasonable fallibilism welcomes a reasoned ethics of belief as well as sound epistemic humility in beliefs and is the philosophical doctrine that absolute certainty about knowledge rather impossible, or at least that all claims to knowledge could, in principle, be mistaken or upon reevaluation need to be amended or removed. Unlike the general thinking of philosophic skepticism like that true knowledge is by definition uncertain, reasonable fallibilism does not imply the need to abandon our ability to reach knowledge, but that knowledge can be revised by further observation, and a need to hold epistemic humility understanding that any of the things we take as knowledge at present might later possibly turn out to be false and thus require amending or changing completely.” ref

“Epistemic itself roughly means is about a relating to knowledge or the conditions for acquiring it.” ref

“In the philosophy of science, epistemic humility is a virtue that emerges from the recognition of the fragility of epistemic confidence (fallibilism) and refers to a posture of scientific observation (Evidentialism) rooted in the recognition that (a) knowledge of the world is always interpreted, structured, and filtered by the observer, and that, as such, (b) scientific pronouncements must be built on the recognition of observation’s inability to grasp the world in itself.” ref

Evidentialism’s epistemic justification contents a dependent upon evidence holding that one is only justified to believe something if and only if that person has evidence which supports the proposed belief implying as well that all faith-based beliefs are unjustified. ref

Some people say that science is not about truth, which may make one wonder, is there scientific truth? Yes, there are truths in science or truths found or figured out by science, and sometimes it is more established then others! Is there evidence that is not true, or fact not held as also true? Both saying the term evidence and fact is to announce a truth claim. ref

Likewise, to profess knowing something is to offer a truth claim. Some people say science does not have absolute truth which I would call something different, “epistemically certain truth”, “epistemically certain facts”, or “epistemically certain knowledge” about observables and not always so for nonobservables that rely on scientific inferences. It is the second that must stay open for doubt to some amount or another commonly not the first kind and the one being referred to what it is said science is not about truth rather in this instance science is a relationship of educated inference guesses of investigated things or that science is a rational methodological set of inferences with the evidence about things they are investigating.

Many science supporters talk about science providing us with “accurate” and “reliable” evidence, facts, explanations and thus knowledge. Even though science is often characterized as such, science, generally, is not thought of or describe as a search for truth even though it is “accurate” that most scientists strive to build knowledge about the natural world that is “reliable” evidence, facts, explanations corresponds to the way the world really works (correspondence theory of truth). Science does try to build true knowledge of how the world works, but it is not philosophy and thus they tend to avoid what people call “the truth” as truth is a value judgment and what makes this judgment seem valid hold different meanings in the various way’s truth can be established. ref

Truth is a main subject of contention even in philosophy and the problems with it are many, starting with what truths are, and what (if anything) makes them true. Whether there are problems of truth and if there is, what kind of theory might address it, are all standing issues in the overarching thinking on a common theory of truth. Basically, the common truth approach science ascribes to in trying to know the truths about the natural world is idea of the correspondence theory which roughly is that what is believed or say to be true should correspond to the way things actually are thus to the facts available. This idea can be seen in various forms throughout the history of philosophy. ref

Faith in gods is evidence devoid uneducated guessing while scientific inference if evidence supported educated guessing. “An inference is an idea or conclusion that’s drawn from evidence and reasoning. An inference is an educated guess. We learn about some things by experiencing them first-hand, but we gain other knowledge by inference thus the process of inferring things based on what is already known.” ref

There in importance in grasping the epistemic significance of valid inference. ” what The traditional picture of logic takes it for granted that valid arguments have a fundamental epistemic significance but lack an account of this significance. Thus, there arises a area of some confusion to explain how and why we can nevertheless use them sometimes to acquire knowledge. how It is suggested that we should distinguish between arguments and acts of inferences and that we have to reconsider the latter notion to arrive at the desired explanation. More precisely, the notions (belief) should be developed so that the following relationship holds: one gets in possession of a ground for a conclusion by inferring it from premisses (related to the know) for which one already has grounds (to know in a correspondence theory of truth way), provided that the inference in question is valid. why Explications of the concepts of the ground and deductively valid inference so that this relationship holds as a conceptual truth. Logical validity of inference is seen as a special case of deductive validity but does not add anything as far as epistemic significance is concerned—it resides already in the deductively valid inferences.” ref

Deductive validity describes arguments that are both factual and logical. Any argument that doesn’t have facts that are actually true or that are not logically sound will not pass the test as a good argument. It is important to be able to determine whether or not an argument is valid because invalid arguments are bad and should not be accepted. ref

When assessing the quality of an argument, ponder how well its premises support its conclusion and whether the argument is either deductively valid or inductively strong. In a deductive argument, the premises are intended to provide such strong support for the conclusion that, if the premises are true, then it would be impossible for the conclusion to be false. An argument in which the premises do succeed in guaranteeing the conclusion is called a (deductively) valid argument. If a valid argument has true premises, then the argument is said also to be sound. The difference between deductive and inductive arguments does not lie in the words used within the arguments, but rather in the intentions of the arguer. It comes from the relationship the arguer takes there to be between the premises and the conclusion. If the arguer believes that the truth of the premises definitely establishes the truth of the conclusion, then the argument is deductive. If the arguer believes that the truth of the premises provides only good reasons to believe the conclusion is probably true, then the argument is inductive.

Although inductive strength is a matter of degree, deductive validity and deductive soundness are not. In this sense, deductive reasoning is much more cut and dried than inductive reasoning. Nevertheless, inductive strength is not a matter of personal preference; it is a matter of whether the premise ought to promote a higher degree of belief in the conclusion. It is worth noting that some dictionaries and texts define “deduction” as reasoning from the general to specific and define “induction” as reasoning from the specific to the general. However, there are many inductive arguments that do not have that form. As noted, the distinction between deductive and inductive has to do with the strength of the justification that the arguer intends that the premises provide for the conclusion. ref

If one’s process of reasoning is a good one, if the premises (something assumed supposed or proved as a basis of argument or inference) actually do provide this sort of justification for the conclusion, then the argument is valid.

In effect, an argument is valid if the truth of the premises logically guarantees the truth of the conclusion. A valid argument may still have a false conclusion. When we construct our arguments, we must aim to construct one that is not only valid, but sound. A sound argument is one that is not only valid but begins with premises that are actually true. It is important to stress that the premises of an argument do not have actually to be true in order for the argument to be valid. An argument is valid if the premises and conclusion are related to each other in the right way so that if the premises were true, then the conclusion would have to be true as well. A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is both valid, and all of its premises are actually true. Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound. ref

Inductive takes specific patterns, trends, examples, trials, or repeated observations for reasoning to make broad generalizing then extrapolate to form a conjecture kind of conclusion drawn from data such as a mathematical theory or generalization. Or conclusions derived from the bottom up. From the specific instance to a generalizing. Relates to the thinking style of empiricism. It can be said that inductively reasoned conclusions tend to relate to probabilities. Thus, it holds a probability of being true or it can be inferred as true. Inductive research tends to begin with observation to collect, understand, or perceive a pattern to generate a hypothesis then from there to a theory. Inductive reasoning may not always produce a true conclusion, but it can provide a hypothesis to investigate and then use deductively valid reasoning to apply the hypothesis to then answer the proposed questions.

Deductive set of data, axioms/postulations statements that are true without needing proof, logic, theorems/fact statements that must be proven to be true, or facts reasoning and deducing other facts from those facts. As well as to form a set of logical arguments that lead to a conclusion. Or conclusions derived from the top down. From a generalizing to the specific instance. So, it roughly states with a general statement, theory, or hypothesis. It relates to the thinking style of rationalism. It can be said that deductively reasoned conclusions tend to relate to certainties. It works its way down to a specific conclusion based on the evidence. Deductive research tends to begin with a theory to generate a hypothesis that must be correct which then guides the logical collection or observation leading to analysis and confirmation. Then there also is abductive reasoning commonly takes incomplete sets of observations to come to the likeliest available explanation used for making and testing a hypothesis from whatever information is available. These explanations are an over-generalization of these useful ideas but still helpful to understand them. ref, ref, ref, ref, ref

Thus, there is a need to grasp just how scientists make reasonable inferences. “Some scientists investigate things that they cannot observe directly. The ability to gather and evaluate evidence is central to scientific inquiry, especially when scientists investigate things that are not directly observable. For example, scientists cannot see dinosaurs, the bottom of the ocean, or atoms and molecules. Still, scientists want to know more about these things, so they gather evidence about them in other ways. For example, they make observations of fossil dinosaur droppings or measure the amount of time it takes sound to travel to the bottom of the ocean. Although atoms and molecules are too small to see, scientists use very powerful microscopes to gather evidence about them. Once scientists have gathered evidence, they use it to make inferences about the things they are investigating.” ref

“For example, when scientists figure out what is in a fossil dinosaur dropping, they can then make inferences about what the dinosaur ate when it was alive. They are not observing the dinosaur eating—they are using evidence to make an inference. Similarly, by measuring the amount of time it takes for sound to travel to the ocean floor, scientists are able to make inferences about how deep the ocean is and what the ocean floor is like. Over time, scientists gather more evidence and become more and more sure of the inferences they have made. Scientists answer questions by gathering and evaluating evidence. One-way scientists gather evidence is through firsthand observation; however, sometimes scientists ask questions about things that are not immediately observable. For example, scientists cannot directly observe an extinct organism or the surface of a faraway planet. In these instances, scientists use inferential reasoning to figure out answers to their questions based on evidence gathered through observations and from information that they or other scientists have already discovered about the topic. Scientists understand that inferences are always subject to revision as new evidence becomes available or new ways of thinking to emerge.” ref

Most people that think science is not at all about truth seem likely to be missing a reasonable understanding of the word truth in relation to science which is roughly that a proposed thing, claim or idea accurately maps with some fact or demonstratable part of reality and how this conception of truth has a relationship with the epistemic knowledge of science. “A study was to develop and validate an online contextualized test for assessing students’ understanding of epistemic knowledge of science. In addition, how students’ understanding of epistemic knowledge of science interacts with learner factors, including time spent on science learning, interest, self-efficacy, and gender, was also explored. The results of this study show that; (1) by factor analysis, the six factors of epistemic knowledge of science could be grouped into two dimensions which reflect the nature of scientific knowledge and knowing in science, respectively; (2) there was a gender difference in the participants’ understanding of the epistemic knowledge of science; and (3) students’ interest in science learning and the time spent on science learning were positively correlated to their understanding of the epistemic knowledge of science which has an epistemic value.” ref

“Epistemic value is a kind of value which attaches to cognitive successes such as true beliefs, justified beliefs, knowledge, and understanding. These kinds of cognitive success do of course often have practical value. True beliefs about local geography help us get to work on time; knowledge of mechanics allows us to build vehicles; understanding of general annual weather patterns helps us to plant our fields at the right time of year to ensure a good harvest. By contrast, false beliefs about the existence of weapons of mass destruction can lead nations to fight hugely expensive wars that are ultimately both destructive and useless. It is fairly uncontroversial that we tend to care about having various cognitive or epistemic goods, at least for their practical value, and perhaps also for their own sakes as cognitive successes. But this uncontroversial point raises a number of important questions. For example: it’s natural to wonder whether there really are all these different kinds of things (true beliefs, knowledge, and so on) which have a distinct value from an epistemic point of view, or whether the value of some of them is reducible to, or depends on, the value of others.” ref

“It’s also natural to think that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, but it has proven to be no easy task explaining where the extra value of knowledge comes from. Similarly, it’s natural to think that understanding is more valuable than any other epistemic state which falls short of understanding, such as true belief or knowledge. But there is disagreement about what makes understanding the highest epistemic value, or what makes it distinctly valuable, or even whether it is distinctly valuable. Indeed, it’s no easy task saying just what makes something an epistemic value in the first place. Do epistemic values just exist on their own, independent of other kinds of value? Or are cognitive goods valuable because we care about having them for their own sakes? Or are they are valuable because they help us to achieve other things which we care about for their own sakes? Furthermore, if we accept that there are things which are epistemically valuable, then we might be tempted to accept what is sometimes called the instrumental (or consequentialist, or teleological) conception of epistemic rationality or justification, which is the view that a belief is epistemically rational just in case it appropriately promotes the achievement of an epistemic goal. If this idea is correct, then we need to know which epistemic values to include in the formulation of the epistemic goal, where the “epistemic goal” is an epistemically valuable goal in light of which we evaluate beliefs as epistemically rational or irrational.” ref

“Being an epistemically virtuous person is often equated with being a critical thinker and focuses on the human agent and the kind of practices that make it possible to arrive at the best accessible approximation of the truth. The epistemic virtues, as identified by virtue epistemologists, reflect their contention that belief is an ethical process, and thus susceptible to the intellectual virtue or vice of one’s own life and personal experiences. Epistemic virtues include the following: attentiveness, conscientiousness, creativity, curiosity, deep thinking, discernment, honesty, humility, intellectual honesty, objectivity, open-mindedness, the principle of charity, studiousness, understanding, wisdom. These can be contrasted to the epistemic vices such as: closed-mindedness, dogmatism, epistemic blindness, gullibility, intellectual dishonesty, self-deception, shallow thinking, the superficiality of thought, superstition, willful naïveté, wishful thinking.” ref  

Scientific Realism

“Debates about Scientific Realism are closely connected to almost everything else in the philosophy of science, for they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively as forms of scientific antirealism.” ref

“Scientific realism is the view that the universe described by science is real regardless of how it may be interpreted. Within philosophy of science, this view is often an answer to the question “how is the success of science to be explained?” The discussion on the success of science in this context centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make valid claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables, as opposed to instrumentalism.” ref

“Scientific realism involves two basic positions. First, it is a set of claims about the features of an ideal scientific theory; an ideal theory is the sort of theory science aims to produce. Second, it is the commitment that science will eventually produce theories very much like an ideal theory and that science has done pretty well thus far in some domains. It is important to note that one might be a scientific realist regarding some sciences while not being a realist regarding others.” ref

“According to scientific realism, an ideal scientific theory has the following features:

• The claims the theory makes are either true or false, depending on whether the entities talked about by the theory exist and are correctly described by the theory. This is the semantic commitment of scientific realism.
• The entities described by the scientific theory exist objectively and mind-independently. This is the metaphysical commitment of scientific realism.
• There are reasons to believe some significant portion of what the theory says. This is the epistemological commitment.” ref

“Combining the first and the second claim entails that an ideal scientific theory says definite things about genuinely existing entities. The third claim says that we have reasons to believe that many scientific claims about these entities are true, but not all. Scientific realism usually holds that science makes progress, i.e. scientific theories usually get successively better, or, rather, answer more and more questions. For this reason, scientific realists or otherwise, hold that realism should make sense of the progress of science in terms of theories being successively more like the ideal theory that scientific realists describe.” ref

“The following claims are typical of those held by scientific realists. Due to the wide disagreements over the nature of science’s success and the role of realism in its success, a scientific realist would agree with some but not all of the following positions:

• The best scientific theories are at least partially true.
• The best theories do not employ central terms that are non referring expressions.
• To say that a theory is approximately true is sufficient explanation of the degree of its predictive success.
• The approximate truth of a theory is the only explanation of its predictive success.
• Even if a theory employs expressions that do not have a reference, a scientific theory may be approximately true.
• Scientific theories are in a historical process of progress towards a true account of the physical world.
• Scientific theories make genuine, existential claims.
• Theoretical claims of scientific theories should be read literally and are definitively either true or false.
• The degree of the predictive success of a theory is evidence of the referential success of its central terms.
• The goal of science is an account of the physical world that is literally true. Science has been successful because this is the goal that it has been making progress towards.” ref

Scientific Realism: “No miracles argument”

“One of the main arguments for scientific realism centers on the notion that scientific knowledge is progressive in nature, and that it is able to predict phenomena successfully. Many scientific realists (e.g., Ernan McMullin, Richard Boyd) think the operational success of a theory lends credence to the idea that its more unobservable aspects exist, because they were how the theory reasoned its predictions. For example, a scientific realist would argue that science must derive some ontological support for atoms from the outstanding phenomenological success of all the theories using them.” ref

“Arguments for scientific realism often appeal to abductive reasoning or “inference to the best explanation” (Lipton, 2004). For instance, one argument commonly used—the “miracle argument” or “no miracles argument”—starts out by observing that scientific theories are highly successful in predicting and explaining a variety of phenomena, often with great accuracy. Thus, it is argued that the best explanation—the only explanation that renders the success of science to not be what Hilary Putnam calls “a miracle”—is the view that our scientific theories (or at least the best ones) provide true descriptions of the world, or approximately so.” ref

“Bas van Fraassen replies with an evolutionary analogy: “I claim that the success of current scientific theories is no miracle. It is not even surprising to the scientific (Darwinist) mind. For any scientific theory is born into a life of fierce competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw. Only the successful theories survive—the ones which in fact latched on to actual regularities in nature.” (The Scientific Image, 1980). Some philosophers (e.g. Colin Howson) have argued that the no miracles argument commits the base rate fallacy.” ref

“Pessimistic induction, one of the main arguments against realism, argues that the history of science contains many theories once regarded as empirically successful but which are now believed to be false. Additionally, the history of science contains many empirically successful theories whose unobservable terms are not believed to genuinely refer. For example, the effluvium theory of static electricity (a theory of the 16th Century physicist William Gilbert) is an empirically successful theory whose central unobservable terms have been replaced by later theories.” ref

“Realists reply that replacement of particular realist theories with better ones is to be expected due to the progressive nature of scientific knowledge, and when such replacements occur only superfluous unobservables are dropped. For example, Albert Einstein‘s theory of special relativity showed that the concept of the luminiferous ether could be dropped because it had contributed nothing to the success of the theories of mechanics and electromagnetism. On the other hand, when theory replacement occurs, a well-supported concept, such as the concept of atoms, is not dropped but is incorporated into the new theory in some form. These replies can lead scientific realists to structural realism.” ref

Science and Pseudo-Science

“The demarcation between science and pseudoscience is part of the larger task of determining which beliefs are epistemically warranted. This entry clarifies the specific nature of pseudoscience in relation to other categories of non-scientific doctrines and practices, including science denial(ism) and resistance to the facts. The major proposed demarcation criteria for pseudo-science are discussed and some of their weaknesses are pointed out. There is much more agreement on particular cases of demarcation than on the general criteria that such judgments should be based upon.” ref

“Demarcations of science from pseudoscience can be made for both theoretical and practical reasons (Mahner 2007, 516). From a theoretical point of view, the demarcation issue is an illuminating perspective that contributes to the philosophy of science in much the same way that the study of fallacies contributes to our knowledge of informal logic and rational argumentation. From a practical point of view, the distinction is important for decision guidance in both private and public life. Since science is our most reliable source of knowledge in a wide range of areas, we need to distinguish scientific knowledge from its look-alikes. Due to the high status of science in present-day society, attempts to exaggerate the scientific status of various claims, teachings, and products are common enough to make the demarcation issue pressing in many areas. The demarcation issue is therefore important in practical applications such as the following:

• Climate policy: The scientific consensus on ongoing anthropogenic climate change leaves no room for reasonable doubt (Cook et al. 2016; Powell 2019). Science denial has considerably delayed climate action, and it is still one of the major factors that impede efficient measures to reduce climate change (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Lewandowsky et al. 2019). Decision-makers and the public need to know how to distinguish between competent climate science and science-mimicking disinformation on the climate.

• Environmental policies: In order to be on the safe side against potential disasters it may be legitimate to take preventive measures when there is valid but yet insufficient evidence of an environmental hazard. This must be distinguished from taking measures against an alleged hazard for which there is no valid evidence at all. Therefore, decision-makers in environmental policy must be able to distinguish between scientific and pseudoscientific claims.

• Healthcare: Medical science develops and evaluates treatments according to evidence of their effectiveness and safety. Pseudoscientific activities in this area give rise to ineffective and sometimes dangerous interventions. Healthcare providers, insurers, government authorities and – most importantly – patients need guidance on how to distinguish between medical science and medical pseudoscience.

• Expert testimony: It is essential for the rule of law that courts get the facts right. The reliability of different types of evidence must be correctly determined, and expert testimony must be based on the best available knowledge. Sometimes it is in the interest of litigants to present non-scientific claims as solid science. Therefore courts must be able to distinguish between science and pseudoscience. Philosophers have often had prominent roles in the defence of science against pseudoscience in such contexts. (Pennock 2011)

• Science education: The promoters of some pseudosciences (notably creationism) try to introduce their teachings in school curricula. Teachers and school authorities need to have clear criteria of inclusion that protect students against unreliable and disproved teachings.

• Journalism: When there is scientific uncertainty, or relevant disagreement in the scientific community, this should be covered and explained in media reports on the issues in question. Equally importantly, differences of opinion between on the one hand legitimate scientific experts and on the other hand proponents of scientifically unsubstantiated claims should be described as what they are. Public understanding of topics such as climate change and vaccination has been considerably hampered by organised campaigns that succeeded in making media portray standpoints that have been thoroughly disproved in science as legitimate scientific standpoints (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Boykoff 2008). The media need tools and practices to distinguish between legitimate scientific controversies and attempts to peddle pseudoscientific claims as science.” ref

“Attempts to define what we today call science have a long history, and the roots of the demarcation problem have sometimes been traced back to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (Laudan 1983). Cicero’s arguments for dismissing certain methods of divination in his De divinatione has considerable similarities with modern criteria for the demarcation of science (Fernandez-Beanato 2020). However, it was not until the 20th century that influential definitions of science have contrasted it against pseudoscience. Philosophical work on the demarcation problem seems to have waned after Laudan’s (1983) much-noted death certificate according to which there is no hope of finding a necessary and sufficient criterion of something as heterogeneous as a scientific methodology. In more recent years, the problem has been revitalized. Philosophers attesting to its vitality maintain that the concept can be clarified by other means than necessary and sufficient criteria (Pigliucci 2013; Mahner 2013) or that such a definition is indeed possible although it has to be supplemented with discipline-specific criteria in order to become fully operative (Hansson 2013).” ref

The Unity of Science

“The topic of unity in the sciences can be explored through the following questions: Is there one privileged, most basic or fundamental concept or kind of thing, and if not, how are the different concepts or kinds of things in the universe related? Can the various natural sciences (e.g.,physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology) be unified into a single overarching theory, and can theories within a single science (e.g., general relativity and quantum theory in physics, or models of evolution and development in biology) be unified? Are theories or models the relevant connected units? What other connected or connecting units are there? Does the unification of these parts of science involve only matters of fact or are matters of value involved as well? What about matters of method, material, institutional, ethical and other aspects of intellectual cooperation? Moreover, what kinds of unity, not just units, in the sciences are there? And is the relation of unification one of reduction, translation, explanation, logical inference, collaboration, or something else? What roles can unification play in scientific practices, their development, application, and evaluation?” ref

“The historical introductory sections have aimed to show the intellectual centrality, varying formulations, and significance of the concept of unity. The rest of the entry presents a variety of modern themes and views. It will be helpful to introduce a number of broad categories and distinctions that can sort out different kinds of accounts and track some relations between them as well as additional significant philosophical issues. (The categories are not mutually exclusive, and they sometimes partly overlap; therefore; while they help label and characterize different positions, they cannot provide a simple, easy and neatly ordered conceptual map.)” ref

“Connective unity is a weaker notion than the specific ideal of reductive unity; this requires asymmetric relations of reduction, with assumptions about hierarchies of levels of description and the primacy—conceptual, ontological, epistemological, and so on—of a fundamental representation. The category of connective unity helps accommodate and bring attention to the diversity of non-reductive accounts.” ref

“Another useful distinction is between synchronic and diachronic unity. Synchronic accounts are ahistorical, assuming no meaningful temporal relations. Diachronic accounts, by contrast, introduce genealogical hypotheses involving asymmetric temporal and causal relations between entities or states of the systems described. Evolutionary models are of this kind; they may be reductive to the extent that the posited original entities are simpler and on a lower level of organization and size. Others simply emphasize connection without overall directionality.” ref

“In general, it is useful to distinguish between ontological unity and epistemological unity, even if many accounts bear both characteristics and fall under both rubrics. In some cases, one kind supports the other salient kind in the model. Ontological unity is here broadly understood as involving relations between descriptive conceptual elements; in some cases, the concepts will describe entities, facts, properties, or relations, and descriptive models will focus on metaphysical aspects of the unifying connections such as holism, emergence, or downwards causation. Epistemological unity applies to epistemic relations or goals such as explanation. Methodological connections and formal (logical, mathematical, etc.) models may belong in this kind. I will not draw any strict or explicit distinction between epistemological and methodological dimensions or modes of unity.” ref

“Additional categories and distinctions include the following: vertical unity or inter-level unity is unity of elements attached to levels of analysis, composition, or organization on a hierarchy, whether for a single science or more, whereas horizontal unity or intra-level unity applies to one single level and to its corresponding kind of system (Wimsatt 2007). Global unity is unity of any other variety with a universal quantifier of all kinds of elements, aspects or descriptions associated with individual sciences as a kind of monism, for instance, taxonomical monism about natural kinds, while local unity applies to a subset (Cartwright has distinguished this same-level global form of reduction, or “imperialism”, in Cartwright 1999; see also Mitchell 2003). Obviously, vertical and horizontal accounts of unity can be either global or local. Finally, the rejection of global unity has been associated with isolationism, keeping independent competing alternative representations of the same phenomena or systems, as well as local integration, the local connective unity of the alternative perspectives. A distinction of methodological nature contrasts internal and external perspectives, according to whether the accounts are based naturalistically, on the local contingent practices of certain scientific communities at a given time, or based on universal metaphysical assumptions broadly motivated (Ruphy 2017). (Ruphy has criticized Cartwright and Dupré for having adopted external metaphysical positions and defended the internal perspective, also present in the program of the so-called Minnesota School, i.e., Kellert et al. 2006.)” ref

Scientific Progress

“Science is often distinguished from other domains of human culture by its progressive nature: in contrast to art, religion, philosophy, morality, and politics, there exist clear standards or normative criteria for identifying improvements and advances in science. For example, the historian of science George Sarton argued that “the acquisition and systematization of positive knowledge are the only human activities which are truly cumulative and progressive,” and “progress has no definite and unquestionable meaning in other fields than the field of science” (Sarton 1936). However, the traditional cumulative view of scientific knowledge was effectively challenged by many philosophers of science in the 1960s and the 1970s, and thereby the notion of progress was also questioned in the field of science. Debates on the normative concept of progress are at the same time concerned with axiological questions about the aims and goals of science. The task of philosophical analysis is to consider alternative answers to the question: What is meant by progress in science? This conceptual question can then be complemented by the methodological question: How can we recognize progressive developments in science? Relative to a definition of progress and an account of its best indicators, one may then study the factual question: To what extent, and in which respects, is science progressive?” ref

“The idea that science is a collective enterprise of researchers in successive generations is characteristic of the Modern Age (Nisbet 1980). Classical empiricists (Francis Bacon) and rationalists (René Descartes) of the seventeenth century urged that the use of proper methods of inquiry guarantees the discovery and justification of new truths. This cumulative view of scientific progress was an important ingredient in the optimism of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and it was incorporated in the 1830s in Auguste Comte’s program of positivism: by accumulating empirically certified truths science also promotes progress in society. Other influential trends in the nineteenth century were the Romantic vision of organic growth in culture, Hegel’s dynamic account of historical change, and the theory of evolution. They all inspired epistemological views (e.g., among Marxists and pragmatists) which regarded human knowledge as a process. Philosopher-scientists with an interest in the history of science (William Whewell, Charles Peirce, Ernst Mach, Pierre Duhem) gave interesting analyses of some aspects of scientific change.” ref

“In the early twentieth century, analytic philosophers of science started to apply modern logic to the study of science. Their main focus was the structure of scientific theories and patterns of inference (Suppe 1977). This “synchronic” investigation of the “finished products” of scientific activities was questioned by philosophers who wished to pay serious attention to the “diachronic” study of scientific change. Among these contributions one can mention N.R. Hanson’s Patterns of Discovery (1958), Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) and Conjectures and Refutations (1963), Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Paul Feyerabend’s incommensurability thesis (Feyerabend 1962), Imre Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970), and Larry Laudan’s Progress and Its Problems (1977). Darwinist models of evolutionary epistemology were advocated by Popper’s Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (1972) and Stephen Toulmin’s Human Understanding (1972). These works challenged the received view about the development of scientific knowledge and rationality. Popper’s falsificationism, Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions, and Feyerabend’s thesis of meaning variance shared the view that science does not grow simply by accumulating new established truths upon old ones. Except perhaps during periods of Kuhnian normal science, theory change is not cumulative or continuous: the earlier results of science will be rejected, replaced, and reinterpreted by new theories and conceptual frameworks. Popper and Kuhn differed, however, in their definitions of progress: the former appealed to the idea that successive theories may approach towards the truth, while the latter characterized progress in terms of the problem-solving capacity of theories.” ref

“Since the mid-1970s, a great number of philosophical works have been published on the topics of change, development, and progress in science (Harré 1975; Stegmüller 1976; Howson 1976; Rescher 1978; Radnitzky and Andersson 1978, 1979; Niiniluoto and Tuomela 1979; Dilworth 1981; Smith 1981; Hacking 1981; Schäfer 1983; Niiniluoto 1984; Laudan 1984a; Rescher 1984; Pitt 1985; Radnitzky and Bartley 1987; Callebaut and Pinxten 1987; Balzer et al. 1987; Hull 1988; Gavroglu et al. 1989; Kitcher 1993; Pera 1994; Chang 2004; Maxwell 2017). These studies have also led to many important novelties being added to the toolbox of philosophers of science. One of them is the systematic study of inter-theory relations, such as reduction (Balzer et al. 1984; Pearce 1987; Balzer 2000; Jonkisz 2000; Hoyningen-Huene and Sankey 2001), correspondence (Krajewski 1977; Nowak 1980; Pearce and Rantala 1984; Nowakowa and Nowak 2000; Rantala 2002), and belief revision (Gärdenfors, 1988; Aliseda, 2006). Another was the recognition that, besides individual statements and theories, there is also a need to consider temporally developing units of scientific activity and achievement: Kuhn’s paradigm-directed normal science, Lakatos’ research programme, Laudan’s research tradition, Wolfgang Stegmüller’s (1976) dynamic theory evolution, Philip Kitcher’s (1993) consensus practice. A new tool that is employed in many defenses of realist views of scientific progress (Niiniluoto 1980, 2014; Aronson, Harré, and Way 1994; Kuipers 2000, 2019) is the notion of truthlikeness or verisimilitude (Popper 1963, 1970).” ref

“Lively interest about the development of science promoted close co-operation between historians and philosophers of science. For example, case studies of historical examples (e.g., the replacement of Newton’s classical mechanics by quantum theory and theory of relativity) have inspired many philosophical treatments of scientific revolutions. Historical case studies were important for philosophers who started to study scientific discovery (Hanson 1958; Nickles 1980). Historically oriented philosophers have shown how instruments and measurements have promoted the progress of physics and chemistry (Chang 2004). Experimental psychologists have argued that the strive for broad and simple explanations shapes learning and inference (Lombrozo 2016). Further interesting material for philosophical discussions about scientific progress is provided by quantitative approaches in the study of the growth of scientific publications (de Solla Price 1963; Rescher 1978) and science indicators (Elkana et al. 1978). Sociologists of science have studied the dynamic interaction between the scientific community and other social institutions. With their influence, philosophers have analyzed the role social and cultural values in the development of science (Longino 2002). One of the favorite topics of sociologists has been the emergence of new scientific specialties (Mulkay 1975; Niiniluoto 1995b). Sociologists are also concerned with the pragmatic problem of progress: what is the best way of organizing research activities in order to promote scientific advance. In this way, models of scientific change turn out to be relevant to issues of science policy (Böhme 1977; Schäfer 1983).” ref

Scientific Method

“Science is an enormously successful human enterprise. The study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which that success is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories. How these are carried out in detail can vary greatly, but characteristics like these have been looked to as a way of demarcating scientific activity from non-science, where only enterprises which employ some canonical form of scientific method or methods should be considered science (see also the entry on science and pseudo-science). Others have questioned whether there is anything like a fixed toolkit of methods which is common across science and only science. Some reject privileging one view of method as part of rejecting broader views about the nature of science, such as naturalism (Dupré 2004); some reject any restriction in principle (pluralism).” ref

“The Scientific Method should be distinguished from the aims and products of science, such as knowledge, predictions, or control. Methods are the means by which those goals are achieved. Scientific method should also be distinguished from meta-methodology, which includes the values and justifications behind a particular characterization of scientific method (i.e., a methodology) — values such as objectivity, reproducibility, simplicity, or past successes. Methodological rules are proposed to govern method and it is a meta-methodological question whether methods obeying those rules satisfy given values. Finally, method is distinct, to some degree, from the detailed and contextual practices through which methods are implemented. The latter might range over: specific laboratory techniques; mathematical formalisms or other specialized languages used in descriptions and reasoning; technological or other material means; ways of communicating and sharing results, whether with other scientists or with the public at large; or the conventions, habits, enforced customs, and institutional controls over how and what science is carried out.” ref

“While it is important to recognize these distinctions, their boundaries are fuzzy. Hence, accounts of method cannot be entirely divorced from their methodological and meta-methodological motivations or justifications, Moreover, each aspect plays a crucial role in identifying methods. Disputes about method have therefore played out at the detail, rule, and meta-rule levels. Changes in beliefs about the certainty or fallibility of scientific knowledge, for instance (which is a meta-methodological consideration of what we can hope for methods to deliver), have meant different emphases on deductive and inductive reasoning, or on the relative importance attached to reasoning over observation (i.e., differences over particular methods.) Beliefs about the role of science in society will affect the place one gives to values in scientific method.” ref

“The issue which has shaped debates over scientific method the most in the last half century is the question of how pluralist do we need to be about method? Unificationists continue to hold out for one method essential to science; nihilism is a form of radical pluralism, which considers the effectiveness of any methodological prescription to be so context-sensitive as to render it not explanatory on its own. Some middle degree of pluralism regarding the methods embodied in scientific practice seems appropriate. But the details of scientific practice vary with time and place, from institution to institution, across scientists and their subjects of investigation. How significant are the variations for understanding science and its success? How much can method be abstracted from practice? This entry describes some of the attempts to characterize scientific method or methods, as well as arguments for a more context-sensitive approach to methods embedded in actual scientific practices.” ref

“The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of science since at least the 17th century (with notable practitioners in previous centuries; see the article history of scientific method for additional detail.) It involves careful observation, applying rigorous skepticism about what is observed, given that cognitive assumptions can distort how one interprets the observation. It involves formulating hypotheses, via induction, based on such observations; the testability of hypotheses, experimental and the measurement-based statistical testing of deductions drawn from the hypotheses; and refinement (or elimination) of the hypotheses based on the experimental findings. These are principles of the scientific method, as distinguished from a definitive series of steps applicable to all scientific enterprises.” ref

“Although procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, the underlying process is frequently the same from one field to another. The process in the scientific method involves making conjectures (hypothetical explanations), deriving predictions from the hypotheses as logical consequences, and then carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those predictions. A hypothesis is a conjecture, based on knowledge obtained while seeking answers to the question. The hypothesis might be very specific, or it might be broad. Scientists then test hypotheses by conducting experiments or studies. A scientific hypothesis must be falsifiable, implying that it is possible to identify a possible outcome of an experiment or observation that conflicts with predictions deduced from the hypothesis; otherwise, the hypothesis cannot be meaningfully tested.” ref

“The purpose of an experiment is to determine whether observations agree with or conflict with the expectations deduced from a hypothesis. Experiments can take place anywhere from a garage to a remote mountaintop to CERN’s Large Hadron Collider. There are difficulties in a formulaic statement of method, however. Though the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it represents rather a set of general principles. Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they are not always in the same order. The scientific method is the process by which science is carried out. As in other areas of inquiry, science (through the scientific method) can build on previous knowledge and develop a more sophisticated understanding of its topics of study over time. This model can be seen to underlie the scientific revolution.” ref

“The overall process involves making conjectures (hypotheses), deriving predictions from them as logical consequences, and then carrying out experiments based on those predictions to determine whether the original conjecture was correct. There are difficulties in a formulaic statement of method, however. Though the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, these actions are better considered as general principles. Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they are not always done in the same order. As noted by scientist and philosopher William Whewell (1794–1866), “invention, sagacity, [and] genius” are required at every step.” ref

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

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Animism: Respecting the Living World by Graham Harvey 

“How have human cultures engaged with and thought about animals, plants, rocks, clouds, and other elements in their natural surroundings? Do animals and other natural objects have a spirit or soul? What is their relationship to humans? In this new study, Graham Harvey explores current and past animistic beliefs and practices of Native Americans, Maori, Aboriginal Australians, and eco-pagans. He considers the varieties of animism found in these cultures as well as their shared desire to live respectfully within larger natural communities. Drawing on his extensive casework, Harvey also considers the linguistic, performative, ecological, and activist implications of these different animisms.” ref

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

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Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

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Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

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Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope’s Art

Damien Marie AtHope (Said as “At” “Hope”)/(Autodidact Polymath but not good at math):

Axiological Atheist, Anti-theist, Anti-religionist, Secular Humanist, Rationalist, Writer, Artist, Jeweler, Poet, “autodidact” Philosopher, schooled in Psychology, and “autodidact” Armchair Archaeology/Anthropology/Pre-Historian (Knowledgeable in the range of: 1 million to 5,000/4,000 years ago). I am an anarchist socialist politically. Reasons for or Types of Atheism

My Website, My Blog, & Short-writing or Quotes, My YouTube, Twitter: @AthopeMarie, and My Email: damien.marie.athope@gmail.com