The Religious Faith Problem?

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The Religious Faith Problem?

“Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences.” Ref

We Do Not Really so much have a religious faith problem, as we have a scientific reality problem. If one would accept scientific realism over religious faith’s (fideism) antirealism/idealism world views, there would be no more religious faith problem. Fideism (faith-ism) is an epistemological theory which maintains that faith is independent of reason, or that reason and faith are hostile to each other and faith is superior at arriving at particular truths. Debates about scientific realism are centrally connected to almost everything else in the philosophy of science, for they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively as forms of scientific antirealism. Epistemologically, realism is committed to the idea that theoretical claims (interpreted literally as describing a mind-independent reality) constitute knowledge of the world. This contrasts with scientific skeptic positions which, even if they grant the metaphysical and semantic dimensions of realism, doubt that scientific investigation is epistemologically powerful enough to yield such knowledge, or, as in the case of some antirealist positions, insist that it is only powerful enough to yield knowledge regarding observables. The epistemological dimension of realism, though shared by realists generally, is sometimes described more specifically in contrary ways. For example, while many realists subscribe to the truth (or approximate truth) of theories understood in terms of some version of the correspondence theory of truth, some prefer deflationary accounts of truth. Though most realists marry their position to the successful reference of theoretical terms, including those for unobservable entities, processes, properties, and relations, some deny that this is a requirement. Amidst these differences, however, a general recipe for realism is widely shared: our best scientific theories give true or approximately true descriptions of observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Ref Ref

Here are representative statements of scientific realism:

The best current scientific theories are at least approximately true.

The central terms of the best current theories are genuinely referential.

The approximate truth of a scientific theory is sufficient explanation of its predictive success.

The (approximate) truth of a scientific theory is the only possible explanation of its predictive success.

A scientific theory may be approximately true even inferentially unsuccessful.

The history of at least the mature sciences shows progressive approximation to a true account of the physical world.

The theoretical claims of scientific theories are to be read literally, and so read are definitively true or false.

Scientific theories make genuine, existential claims.

The predictive success of a theory is evidence for the referential success of its central terms.

Science aims at a literally true account of the physical world, and its success is to be reckoned by its progress toward achieving this aim. Ref

Most importantly what do contemporary professional philosophers believe in the external world so value non-skeptical realism 81.6%; scientific realism 75.1%; atheism 72.8%; A priori knowledge: yes 71.1%; Free will: compatibilism 59.1%; Mind: physicalism 56.5%; moral realism 56.4%; Truth: correspondence 50.8%; Metaphilosophy: naturalism 49.8%; Epistemic justification: externalism 42.7%; Aesthetic value: objective 41.0%; Knowledge claims: contextualism 40.1%; Knowledge: empiricism 35.0%; rationalism 27.8%.

The philosophical views of 1,972 contemporary professional philosophers, 77.2% specified “male,” 17.4% specified “female,” and 5.3% did not specify a gender and that included 62 departments in the US, 18 in the UK, 7 in Europe outside the UK, 7 in Canada, and 5 in Australasia were:

Main answers

The following list summarizes the results for the target faculty group, collapsing answers

that “accept” and “lean toward” a given view and collapsing all “other” answers.

A priori knowledge: yes 71.1%; no 18.4%; other 10.5%.
Abstract objects: Platonism 39.3%; nominalism 37.7%; other 23.0%.
Aesthetic value: objective 41.0%; subjective 34.5%; other 24.5%.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes 64.9%; no 27.1%; other 8.1%.
Epistemic justification: externalism 42.7%; internalism 26.4%; other 30.8%.
External world: non-skeptical realism 81.6%; skepticism 4.8%; idealism 4.3%; other 9.2%.
Free will: compatibilism 59.1%; libertarianism 13.7%; no free will 12.2%; other 14.9%.
God: atheism 72.8%; theism 14.6%; other 12.6%.
Knowledge claims: contextualism 40.1%; invariantism 31.1%; relativism 2.9%; other 25.9%.
Knowledge: empiricism 35.0%; rationalism 27.8%; other 37.2%.
Laws of nature: non-Humean 57.1%; Humean 24.7%; other 18.2%.
Logic: classical 51.6%; non-classical 15.4%; other 33.1%.
Mental content: externalism 51.1%; internalism 20.0%; other 28.9%.
Meta-ethics: moral realism 56.4%; moral anti-realism 27.7%; other 15.9%.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism 49.8%; non-naturalism 25.9%; other 24.3%.
Mind: physicalism 56.5%; non-physicalism 27.1%; other 16.4%.
Moral judgment: cognitivism 65.7%; non-cognitivism 17.0%; other 17.3%.
Moral motivation: internalism 34.9%; externalism 29.8%; other 35.3%.
Newcomb’s problem: two boxes 31.4%; one box 21.3%; other 47.4%.
Normative ethics: deontology 25.9%; consequentialism 23.6%; virtue ethics 18.2%; other 32.3%.
Perceptual experience: representationalism 31.5%; qualia theory 12.2%; disjunctivism 11.0%; sense-datum theory 3.1%; other 42.2%.
Personal identity: psychological view 33.6%; biological view 16.9%; further-fact view 12.2%; other 37.3%.
Politics: egalitarianism 34.8%; communitarianism 14.3%; libertarianism 9.9%; other 41.0%.
Proper names: Millian 34.5%; Fregean 28.7%; other 36.8%.
Science: scientific realism 75.1%; scientific anti-realism 11.6%; other 13.3%.
Teletransporter: survival 36.2%; death 31.1%; other 32.7%.
Time: B-theory 26.3%; A-theory 15.5%; other 58.2%.
Trolley problem: switch 68.2%; don’t switch 7.6%; other 24.2%.
Truth: correspondence 50.8%; deflationary 24.8%; epistemic 6.9%; other 17.5%.
Zombies: conceivable but not metaphysically possible 35.6%; metaphysically possible 23.3%; inconceivable 16.0%; other 25.1%. Ref

An End to Faith

Axiology vs. Nihilism

Philosophy to The Rescue

Rational Belief not Religion.

Scientific Thinking not Faith Thinking

Scientific Misinterpretations Promote Relativism

The Scientific Method & Naturalistic Rationalism

Scientific Values: fallibilism, realism, & rationalism

Yes, We All Have Beliefs; But What Does That Mean?

Agnosticism Beliefs Involve “FOLK LOGIC” Thinking?

Science Facts Should Make Religious Belief Impossible

I Am a Strong Atheist: “I am psychologically certain god(s) don’t exist”

Philosophical Skepticism, Solipsism and the Denial of Reality or Certainty

Axiology and Value Consciousness

Grasping the status of truth (ontology of truth)

Challenged or Challenging? (questions of ontology)

Axiology, Naturalism, Realism and Moral Theory Ideas

Ontology, Epistemology, & Axiology argument/challenge protocol

“The Hammer if Truth” (scientific philosophy: Ontology, Epistemology, & Axiology) in action.

Explaining Axiological theism, Axiological agnosticism, and Axiological atheism

Axiological Atheism Explained

Scientific realism

“Scientific realism is the view that the universe described by science is real regardless of how it may be interpreted. Within philosophy of science, this view is often an answer to the question “how is the success of science to be explained?” The discussion on the success of science in this context centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make valid claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables, as opposed to instrumentalist.” ref

“Scientific realism is related to much older philosophical positions including rationalism and metaphysical realism. However, it is a thesis about science developed in the twentieth century. Portraying scientific realism in terms of its ancient, medieval, and early modern cousins is at best misleading. Scientific realism is developed largely as a reaction to logical positivism. Logical positivism was the first philosophy of science in the twentieth century and the forerunner of scientific realism, holding that a sharp distinction can be drawn between theoretical terms and observational terms, the latter capable of semantic analysis in observational and logical terms.” ref

“Logical positivism encountered difficulties with:

The verificationist theory of meaning—see Hempel (1950).
Troubles with the analytic-synthetic distinction—see Quine (1950).
The theory-ladenness of observation—see Hanson (1958) Kuhn (1970) and Quine (1960).
Difficulties moving from the observationality of terms to observationality of sentences—see Putnam (1962).
The vagueness of the observational-theoretical distinction—see G. Maxwell (1962).” ref

“These difficulties for logical positivism suggest, but do not entail, scientific realism, and led to the development of realism as a philosophy of science. Realism became the dominant philosophy of science after positivism. Bas van Fraassen in his book The Scientific Image (1980) developed constructive empiricism as an alternative to realism. He argues against scientific realism that scientific theories do not aim for truth about unobservable entities. Responses to van Fraassen have sharpened realist positions and led to some revisions of scientific realism.” ref

No Miracles Argument

“One of the main arguments for scientific realism centers on the notion that scientific knowledge is progressive in nature, and that it is able to predict phenomena successfully. Many scientific realists (e.g., Ernan McMullin, Richard Boyd) think the operational success of a theory lends credence to the idea that its more unobservable aspects exist, because they were how the theory reasoned its predictions. For example, a scientific realist would argue that science must derive some ontological support for atoms from the outstanding phenomenological success of all the theories using them.” ref

“Arguments for scientific realism often appeal to abductive reasoning or “inference to the best explanation” (Lipton, 2004). For instance, one argument commonly used—the “miracle argument” or “no miracles argument”—starts out by observing that scientific theories are highly successful in predicting and explaining a variety of phenomena, often with great accuracy. Thus, it is argued that the best explanation—the only explanation that renders the success of science to not be what Hilary Putnam calls “a miracle”—is the view that our scientific theories (or at least the best ones) provide true descriptions of the world, or approximately so.” ref

“Bas van Fraassen replies with an evolutionary analogy: “I claim that the success of current scientific theories is no miracle. It is not even surprising to the scientific (Darwinist) mind. For any scientific theory is born into a life of fierce competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw. Only the successful theories survive—the ones which in fact latched on to actual regularities in nature.” (The Scientific Image, 1980) Some philosophers (e.g. Colin Howson) have argued that the no miracles argument commits the base rate fallacy.” ref

I classify Animism as (animated ‘spirit‘ or “supernatural” perspectives) and I see all religious people as at least animists, so, all religions have at least some amount, kind, or expression of animism as well.

I want to make something clear as I can, as simple as I can, even though I classify Animism (animated and alive from Latin: anima, ‘breath, spirit, life‘ or peoples’ “spiritual” or “supernatural” perspectives. Potentially, in some animism perceives, all things may relate to some spiritual/supernatural/non-natural inclinations, even a possible belief that objects, places, and/or creatures all possess a distinct spiritual essence, and/or thinking things like all things—animals, plants, rocks, rivers, weather systems, human handiwork, and perhaps even words— could be as animated and alive ref) as the first expression of religious thinking or religion, it is not less than, nor is it not equal to any other religion, or religious thinking. I see all religious people as at least animists any way, so everyone is at least animist, how could it be less than other religions as all other religions have at least some amount, kind, or expression of animism. Animism, +? is what I think about all that say they are spiritual or religious in thinking. Regardless if they know it, understand it, or claim it, they all, to me, an animistic-thinker, plus a paganistic, totemistic, and shamanistic-monotheist, calling themselves a Christian, Jew, or Muslim, as an example of my thinking. Animism (is the other-then-reality thinking relates to, thus it is in all such non-reality thinking generally.

Furthermore, I actually am impressed by animist cultures in Africa, others have seen them as primitive or something, help with that, they are revolutionaries with women’s rights, child rights. I mean if I had to choose a religion it would be animism only like in Africa so I don’t look down on them nor any indigenous peoples, who I care about, as well as I am for “humanity for all.” I challenge religious Ideas, and this is not meant to be an attack on people, but rather a challenge to think or rethink ideas, I want what is actually true. May we all desire a truly honest search for what is true even if we have to update what we believe or know. I even have religious friends, as I am not a bigot.

I class religious thinking in “time of origin” not somehow that any are better or worse or more reasoned than others. No, I am trying to help others understand how things happened, so they understand, and for themselves can finally think does the religion they say they believe in, still seems true, as they believed before learning my information and art. I am hoping I inspire freedom of thought and development of heart as well as mind as we need such a holistic approach in our quest for a humanity free for all and supportive of all. Until then, train your brain to think ethically. We are responsible for the future, we are the future, living in the present, soon to be passed, so we must act with passion, because life is over just like that. I am just another fellow dignity being. May I be a good human.

“Animism (from Latin: anima, ‘breath, spirit, life‘) is the belief that objects, places, and creatures all possess a distinct spiritual essence. Potentially, animism perceives all things—animals, plants, rocks, rivers, weather systems, human handiwork, and perhaps even words—as animated and alive. Animism is used in the anthropology of religion as a term for the belief system of many indigenous peoples, especially in contrast to the relatively more recent development of organized religions.” ref

“Although each culture has its own different mythologies and rituals, animism is said to describe the most common, foundational thread of indigenous peoples’ “spiritual” or “supernatural” perspectives. The animistic perspective is so widely held and inherent to most indigenous peoples that they often do not even have a word in their languages that corresponds to “animism” (or even “religion”); the term is an anthropological construct.” ref

“Largely due to such ethnolinguistic and cultural discrepancies, opinion has differed on whether animism refers to an ancestral mode of experience common to indigenous peoples around the world, or to a full-fledged religion in its own right. The currently accepted definition of animism was only developed in the late 19th century (1871) by Sir Edward Tylor, who formulated it as “one of anthropology‘s earliest concepts, if not the first.” ref

“Animism encompasses the beliefs that all material phenomena have agency, that there exists no categorical distinction between the spiritual and physical (or material) world and that soul or spirit or sentience exists not only in humans but also in other animals, plants, rocks, geographic features such as mountains or rivers or other entities of the natural environment: water sprites, vegetation deities, tree spirits, etc. Animism may further attribute a life force to abstract concepts such as words, true names, or metaphors in mythology. Some members of the non-tribal world also consider themselves animists (such as author Daniel Quinn, sculptor Lawson Oyekan, and many contemporary Pagans).” ref

Scientific realism

No Miracles Argument

The Atheist-Humanist-Leftist Revolutionaries Shows in the prehistory series:

Damien Marie AtHope (Said as “At” “Hope”)/(Autodidact Polymath but not good at math):

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